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An Ancient Virtue and its Heirs: The Reception of Greatness of Soul in the Arabic 
Tradition 
 
 
Among the many lives the ancient virtue of greatness of soul has led in philosophical and 
theological history, one remains conspicuously unwritten. This is the life it led in the Islamic 
world and the Arabic tradition. This world, as we know, opened its doors wide to the ancient 
philosophical legacy early in its history, and continued a lively engagement with it for a period 
of centuries. It was an engagement that was marked by amity but also by moments of high 
conflict, and it is the conflict that has frequently shaped prevailing views of the place of 
philosophy in the Islamic world, with al-Ghazālī’s one-man no-holds-barred campaign against 
the philosophers serving as the rallying point for such views. This picture has recently begun to 
loosen its scholarly grip, and a changing view of al-Ghazālī’s own relationship to philosophy has 
been among the many tributaries to its reversal. In recent times, several readers have re-
directed attention to al-Ghazālī’s indebtedness and continued appreciation of the philosophical 
tradition.1 Many of these writings and re-writings of the status of philosophy in the Islamic 
world have focused, unsurprisingly, on issues of metaphysics. These were after all the issues 
that apparently channelled al-Ghazālī’s discomfort in his celebrated work, The Precipitance of 
the Philosophers2. Yet a finer calibration of this story of amity-and-conflict could not be achieved 
without taking into account the interaction of Muslim writers with the ethical elements of the 
ancient tradition.  
Ethics has sometimes seemed an unpromising subject to commentators addressing the 
history of philosophy in the Islamic world. “Falsafa,” as Peter Adamson quietly notes in a 
conspectus of the Arabic tradition, “is not particularly known for its contributions to ethics” 
(Adamson 2010, 63). The intellectual giants of Arabic philosophy, such as Avicenna and 
Averroes, devoted their immense energies to other areas of philosophical inquiry and mostly 
turned a cold shoulder to ethical topics. Those works of philosophical ethics that were written 
seem to lack the intellectual élan that gives sparkle to works in other areas; and even among 
writers with overt religious commitments, conflict does not seem to be in the air to make it 
                                                 
1 A key stimulus for such re-readings was Richard Frank’s seminal account of al-Ghazālī’s cosmology in 
Frank 1992, but since that time they have gathered apace. For useful pointers to this scholarship, see 
Garden 2014, 5-7. 
2 Or Incoherence of the Philosophers, as it is often known. See Treiger 2012 for a defence of this alternative 
translation (Appendix B) and also, more broadly, for an account that contributes to the re-reading of al-
Ghazālī’s relationship to philosophy. 
  
crackle. In his famous autobiography where he discusses his relationship to philosophy, notably, 
al-Ghazālī treats ethics with comparatively velvet gloves. 
 These perspectives form the backdrop of my present paper, which proposes to tell the 
neglected story of the reception of the ancient virtue of greatness of soul in the Islamic world. It 
is a story that would prima facie seem calculated to engage this backdrop especially strongly. 
For nothing, if not conflict, has characterised the passage of this virtue in our philosophical and 
theological history. This conflict has been palpable among recent philosophers, even among 
votaries of Aristotle’s ethics, who have taken turns decrying his depiction of greatness of soul 
for a litany of moral evils, including above all a flawed mode of self-evaluation and failure of 
humility. Yet it has also been palpable in the reactions of earlier eras, not least within 
theological circles, as suggested by the history of the Christian engagement with the ancient 
tradition. The tension between greatness of soul or magnanimity and humility, as Jennifer Herdt 
remarks, “is often seen as capturing the basic tension between pagan and Christian conceptions 
of virtue” (Herdt 2008, 40). This history of strained responses provides an important additional 
foil for considering the Arabic reception.  
 The biographical course this virtue has traced within the Arabic tradition, as I hope to 
show, is a complex one. Set against the foils just outlined, it stands out as a story that is as much 
about acts as it is about omissions—as much about what was said as about what wasn’t—and 
one in which the theme of conflict does not assert itself but has to be educed. It also stands out 
as a story in which the identity of its subject, as in all good stories, undergoes transformation in 
the telling.  Because one of its surprises is that there are no less than two distinct Arabic 
concepts that can be identified as heirs or counterparts of the ancient virtue of greatness that 
was megalopsychia, concepts whose genealogies and trajectories converged but also diverged in 
crucial respects. In this respect, plotting the biography of this virtue helps provide new insight 
not only into the Arabic reception of ancient ethics, but also into the sources and pattern of 
Islamic ethical thought more broadly.  
 To reflect this complexity, I will be telling the story in two stages. In this paper, I will be 
focusing on one of these two virtues of greatness, which is also the virtue that can be most 
straightforwardly identified as the “heir” of the ancient one and whose story might be most 
naturally identified as the story of the Arabic reception of the ancient legacy. While I touch on a 
number of figures in Arabic philosophical ethics, the bulk of my discussion focuses on two major 
ethical writers, Miskawayh (d. 1030) and (even more directly) al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). Greatness of 
soul, I will suggest, sits uneasily within the ethical schemes of these writers, particularly al-
Ghazālī’s, for reasons that evoke those that have troubled past and present commentators on 
the virtue. Gaining this insight demands placing this virtue into fuller conversation with their 
ethical schemes. Yet this forced conversation, shunned by the participants themselves, never 
becomes open conflict, and this raises important questions about the nature of the Arabic 
engagement of the ancient ethical tradition. 
 So much for the main story. Launching into it, however, requires a couple of 
preliminaries: a brief word about the identity of the ancient virtue of greatness of soul, and 
another word about the textual sources that gave Arab thinkers access to it. 
 
 
Greatness of soul: one virtue, many configurations 
 
I have referred to “the” ancient virtue of greatness of soul as if there was one virtue to speak of. 
Yet in opening this account, it will be important to register that this was not a virtue that 
enjoyed perfect unity or stability over time, but one that harboured competing tendencies and 
provoked different articulations, no less within the ancient context than in later philosophical 
history. Even Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics—no doubt the best-known 
philosophical account of the virtue—has often been read as an attempt to adjudicate between 
  
the different meanings the virtue carried in his own time, as he had outlined them in an oft-cited 
passage of the Posterior Analytics.3 
 Greatness of soul, as it emerges in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be described as a virtue 
of self-knowledge or self-evaluation. In Aristotle’s well-thumbed formulation, it is a quality that 
belongs to “the sort of person that thinks himself, and is, worthy of great things” (1123b1-2).4 
Packed into this remark is an understanding of greatness of soul as a virtue incorporating a 
relationship between three terms: a person’s actual worth, his judgement about his worth, and 
(his judgement about) what his worth entitles him to. The basis of this person’s worth is his 
virtue or excellence. “The truly great-souled man must be good,” indeed superlatively so: 
“greatness in respect of each of the excellences would seem to belong to the great-souled 
person” (1123b28). That to which it entitles him is honour, which is the greatest of all external 
goods, the one we even bestow upon the gods. The great-souled man is the person of great 
moral character who, knowing his greatness, knows the recognition it entitles him to receive 
from others. Greatness of soul is thus principally concerned with honour. 
 This thumbnail sketch of Aristotle’s view is worth holding on to; yet for the account that 
follows, it is also worth attuning ourselves to some of the nuances which make for its specific 
identity, and which open out to different ways of configuring the latter. The passage of the 
Posterior Analytics just referred to offers a good handle for the purpose. There (II.13.97b15–25) 
Aristotle had identified two key semantic strands of the virtue, “intolerance of insults” (notably 
exemplified by Achilles) and “indifference to fortune” (notably exemplified by Socrates). In 
crafting his own account in the Ethics, he had preserved the first meaning by connecting 
greatness of soul to honour, but he had effected a critical revision when it came to framing the 
strength of attachment that honour should arouse. The great-souled man should only be 
“moderately pleased” when he gets the great honour he merits; for it is after all only his due, 
and “there could be no honour worthy of complete excellence” (1124a6-8). And while his 
account focused on honour, he had also preserved the second meaning by tying greatness of 
soul to a similar stance extending beyond honour to encompass all external goods, one that 
crucially mitigated the attitude of Socratic indifference by the same emphasis on moderation. 
The great-souled man will be “moderately disposed in relation to wealth, political power, and 
any kind of good or bad fortune,” and he will “neither be over-pleased at good fortune nor over-
distressed at bad” (1124a13-16). He is someone ultimately little given to strong responses, 
whether of dismay or admiration: his sense of his own greatness is partly expressed in the sense 
that “nothing is great” (1125a2). 
 These moves would be negotiated differently at the hands of other thinkers and other 
philosophical schools, resulting in competing configurations of the virtue. The dominant Stoic 
approach notably reflected the sharper stance these thinkers adopted on the broader question 
of the value of external goods for the ethical life and the role of luck in the human good. 
Greatness of soul would thus be inscribed among them as a virtue embodying their distinctive 
ideal of confronting vicissitudes of fortune with equanimity, affirming the human ability to lead 
a life of virtue in the face of them and treating external goods with a contempt that revived 
Socrates’ more categorical indifference. Cicero provided a key expression of this view in his On 
Duties when he described greatness of spirit as lying in “disdain for things external, in the 
conviction that a man should admire, should choose, should pursue, nothing except what is 
honourable and seemly, and should yield to no man, nor to agitation of the spirit, nor to fortune” 
(Book 1, 66).5 He also contributed another important element when fleshing out his reference to 
the pursuit of “what is honourable” as an imperative to “do deeds which are great, certainly, and 
above all beneficial,” calibrating Aristotle’s emphasis on receiving through a stronger emphasis 
on the passion for doing. The admiration of virtue voiced in this remark, similarly, was coupled 
to an oft-expressed admiration directed to the human subject in its ability to realise such lofty 
                                                 
3 For discussion of this point (and of Aristotle’s view of greatness of soul more generally) see Cooper 
1989; Pakaluk 2004, 269-70; and Crisp 2006, 169-70. 
4 I draw on Rowe’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics (2002) with occasional modifications.  
5 For further discussion of the Stoic approach to the virtue, see also Gauthier 1951, part 1, chapter 4.  
  
values, one that preserved Aristotle’s emphasis on self-evaluation while delicately deflecting it 
from the individual person to the human subject in its higher capacities. “I am too great, was 
born to too great a destiny,” Seneca declares with characteristic hauteur in one his Epistles, “to 
be my body’s slave” (Epistle 65, 21); and again: “Reflect that nothing except the soul is worthy of 
wonder; for to the soul, if it be great, naught is great” (Epistle 8, 5).6 
 This selective overflight already suggests that greatness of soul was a virtue hosting a 
number of conceptual strands, strands that could be configured in ways that yielded divergent 
articulations. We might heuristically pick out three such strands: one incorporating an attitude 
to the self (a judgement of self-worth), another incorporating an attitude to external goods 
(honour but also good and bad luck more broadly), and arguably yet a third incorporating an 
attitude to acting rather than receiving or reacting.7  
In moving to the Arabic context, this schematic outline of the plural elements and 
identities of the virtue is worth keeping in view. Yet it is also worth bearing in mind that an even 
more nuanced survey of ancient configurations of this virtue would need to go beyond such 
schematisations, and attend to the more intricate pattern of intellectual moves made in the 
eclectic environment of later Hellenistic philosophy. This point is particularly relevant in view of 
the textual sources that can be identified as having provided the chief means of access to the 
virtue within the Islamic world. For these include, on the one hand, some of the major works of 
Greek ethics in which greatness of soul formed a significant element, such as the Nicomachean 
Ethics (available in Arabic translation from around the second half of the ninth century) and, to 
a lesser extent, Plato’s Republic (available not as an integral text but in the form of short 
quotations, excerpts and abridgements from a similar time). Yet they also include a small flotilla 
of texts of varying length, many characterised by a complicated textual history and elusive 
authorship, whose philosophical identity was the product of various kinds of intellectual 
syncretism. In this list one must place the Summa Alexandrinorum, an epitome of the 
Nicomachean Ethics of contested provenance (a translation from a late Greek text or an original 
Arabic composition?), several parts of which, including significantly the discussion of greatness 
of soul, are only preserved in Latin; the pseudo-Aristotelian De Virtutibus et vitiis, extant in two 
Arabic translations; an additional “seventh book” incorporated into the Arabic version of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which according to one conjecture may derive from a lost commentary by 
Porphyry; and a short treatise on ethics by a certain “Nicolaus” which was found with the 
manuscript of the Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.8 These short texts achieved 
wide circulation in the Arabic-speaking world among authors writing about ethics in a 
philosophical vein, and although their treatment of greatness of soul does not compare to 
treatments like Aristotle’s in either depth and length, reflecting their overall brevity and 
epitomic character, it is a theme in all of them.  
 
 
Defining a virtue 
 
The above has offered an overview in nuce of the identity of greatness of soul and the routes by 
which Arab thinkers might have come to learn about it. In doing so, it has also pulled into view 
some of the grounds for the ambivalence with which this virtue has been met by numerous 
thinkers of different times, and for the mixed sense of fascination and repugnance which its 
larger-than-life éclat has aroused. The impossible hauteur captured by Seneca’s turn of 
phrase—“I am too great”—precipitates a sense of discomfort that has usually pitted itself, less 
against its Stoic casting, than against its more individualistic Aristotelian counterpart. 
Responding to features that came into view above and also to some that didn’t, many of 
                                                 
6 I draw on different translations of Seneca’s Epistles here, respectively Campbell 2004 and Gummere 
1918-25.  
7 To identify these as distinct strands, of course, is not to deny that they were intimately enmeshed.  
8 For this textual background, good starting points are Dunlop’s introduction to Aristotle 2005, 1-109; 
Ullmann 2011; Zonta 2003; and Akasoy 2012. 
  
Aristotle’s modern readers have castigated the portrait of the great-souled man for his 
arrogance and almost stagnant self-satisfaction; his leonine inability to rouse himself for 
anything but the greatest deeds; his ungratefulness and inability to acknowledge his debts—an 
inability inscribed in the ideal of “self-sufficiency” Aristotle imputes to him (NE 1125a12). No 
wonder greatness of soul has enjoyed the dubious distinction of figuring as “the relativists’ 
favorite target,” as Martha Nussbaum notes, flagged for its cultural contingency and taken to 
imply “in its very name an attitude to one’s own worth that is more Greek than universal” 
(Nussbaum 1988, 38).9 
Several of these qualms resonate with ones that have historically animated the Christian 
reception of this virtue, set in the horizon of the broader Christian engagement with pagan 
ethics. In spearheading this engagement, Augustine himself had not singled out greatness of soul 
as an intrinsically reprehensible trait. His few references to the virtue in the City of God, for 
example, show him not so much contesting its status as a virtue as contesting its proper 
application, in a way that presupposes its acceptance as a virtue or term of praise.10 Yet many of 
the faults he found with pagan ethics could be said to be enshrined in this virtue, including the 
preoccupation with honour or glory, the aspiration to self-sufficiency (present in even starker 
tones within the Stoic construction of the virtue), and the vice of pride that orders everything to 
the self, to the extent that the great-souled man’s “consciousness of his own moral worth infects 
his motivation” (Herdt 2008, 50; and see more broadly her discussion in chapter 2). A sense of 
unease with the ethical credentials of greatness of soul certainly stood in the backdrop of 
Aquinas’ own reconstruction of the virtue in his Summa Theologiae, which reconfigured its 
relationship to humility and gratitude in ways that served to embed it more harmoniously into 
the Christian ethical standpoint. In both philosophical and theological circles, greatness of soul 
has thus often served as a threshing ground and sometimes battleground of values. 
Coming from this background, one can only approach the Arabic encounter with this 
virtue with a sense of high moment. The sense of moment will seem higher still if we consider 
that in the Arabic-Islamic case, this is an encounter that unfolded on very different terms—more 
suddenly and less organically—than in the case of the Christian tradition, which developed in a 
cultural environment still suffused with the values of the ancient world. In the Arabic case, by 
contrast, this encounter has the character of a sharper linguistic and cultural confrontation, one 
more likely to capture our imagination and put us in the mind of the potential for collision. It is 
the sudden encounter between a language and cultural domain that contains the concept of 
megalopsychia and one that doesn’t, and needs to find the resources for accommodating it.  
Where to watch for this encounter? One of the first places one will think to look is the 
work of al-Fārābī (d. 950), who stands out as one of the few major philosophers in the Arabic 
tradition to have taken a concerted interest in the normative parts of the philosophical 
curriculum. Al-Fārābī’s interest lies disproportionately in political philosophy rather than 
ethics, and in his political works, it is Plato’s rather than Aristotle’s influence that figures most 
visibly. Greatness of soul appears at two significant junctures of his writings, once in his 
celebrated political work On the Perfect State and once in the shorter work The Attainment of 
Happiness. In both cases it appears as part of a list of qualities required in the philosopher-king 
which mirrors the list Plato had given in the Republic (486a, 487a), using the term 
megaloprepeia. The adjectival Arabic term is kabīr al-nafs, which is a direct calque of the Greek 
                                                 
9 Cf. 34, referencing the remarks of Bernard Williams and Stuart Hampshire. For an overview of some of 
the most common criticisms of Aristotle’s megalopsychos, see Crisp 2006, 169-74. 
10 A good example are his remarks in the context of arguing against the idea that suicide displays this 
virtue. “Greatness of spirit is not the right term to apply” to a person who killed himself to avoid hardship 
or injustice; “we rightly ascribe greatness to a spirit that has the strength to endure a life of misery 
instead of running away from it, and to despise the judgement of men.” At the same time, Augustine opens 
greatness of spirit to a kind of fallibility that will certainly seem remarkable coming from Aristotle’s view 
of the virtue as presupposing consummate goodness, as suggested by Augustine’s remark that 
Theombrotus, who is said to have killed himself to attain eternal life sooner, “showed greatness rather 
than goodness.” See Augustine 2003, Bk I, §22, 32-33. 
  
(literally, “large of soul”). The philosopher, al-Fārābī writes in On the Perfect State, “should be 
great-souled (kabīr al-nafs) and fond of honour, his soul being naturally above (takburu 
nafsuhu) everything ugly and base.”11 One point to notice is that greatness of soul, which in 
Plato’s discussion had borne a distinct link to intellectual activity, is here connected to ethical 
excellence and concern for honour in a way that gravitates more heavily toward Aristotle’s 
account in the Nicomachean Ethics.12 Yet such observations to the side, these modest remarks 
seem to exhaust al-Fārābī’s interest in the virtue. It is striking that in the detailed discussion of 
the virtues—one that significantly displays the strong influence of Aristotelian ideas—offered in 
another of his major political works, Aphorisms of the Statesman, al-Fārābī remains wholly silent 
on greatness of soul. When listing the virtues concerned with self-evaluation, it is in fact 
humility (tawāḍuʿ) that appears as the mean, flanked by the vices of arrogance (takabbur) and 
abjectness or self-abasement (takhāsus) (al-Fārābī 1971, 36). 
 The natural place to turn in hopes of a closer engagement with the virtue is a work 
which perhaps forms the most celebrated compendium of philosophical ethics in the Arabic 
tradition, Miskawayh’s The Refinement of Character. Among its other distinctive features, this 
work features an extensive section dedicated to the discussion of the virtues and vices. These 
are arranged in a manner which betrays the peculiar brand of philosophical eclecticism at work 
among Arab philosophers—one that, as suggested above, partly reflects the character of their 
textual sources—relying on an Aristotelian principle to distinguish between a virtuous mean 
and two vicious extremes, but relying on a tripartite faculty psychology inherited from Plato to 
identify the cardinal virtues and map these onto the rational, appetitive and irascible faculties. 
Wisdom is the virtue of the rational faculty (or soul), courage the virtue of the irascible faculty, 
temperance the virtue of the appetitive faculty, and justice the virtue that results from the 
combination of these virtues.13 Yet the specific structure of the virtues and in particular the 
distinction between a number of cardinal virtues and a far greater number of subordinate 
virtues speaks to a practice typically associated with the Stoics.14 Following one’s finger down 
the tables of the virtues—past the six virtues under wisdom, past the twelve virtues under 
temperance—one will find greatness of soul under the irascible faculty, the first of eight virtues 
presented as subordinate to courage. The entry reads as follows. “As for greatness of soul (kibar 
al-nafs), it is the disdain for what is insignificant and the capacity to bear honour and dishonour. 
The one who possesses this virtue always judges himself worthy of great things while [indeed] 
deserving them” (Miskawayh 1966, 21).15  
                                                 
11 I draw on the translation by Richard Walzer (al-Fārābī 1985, 246-48) with a number of modifications. 
Cf. al-Fārābī 1995, 96.  
12 For more on Plato’s view of greatness of soul and the link to intellectual activity, see Gauthier 1951, 
part 1, chapter 2; cf. the discussion in Vasalou 2013, chapter 5.  
13 I am simplifying certain things, as Miskawayh maps a pair of central virtues onto each faculty. See 
Miskawayh 1966, 16-18. Note that Miskawayh interestingly only deploys the mesotes scheme for the 
cardinal virtues, in contrast for example to al-Ghazālī. 
14 Cf. Richard Walzer’s remarks in “Some Aspects of Miskawaih’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq,” in Walzer 1962, 222-
23. 
15 Huwa al-istihāna biʾl-yasīr waʾl-iqtidār ʿala ḥaml al-karāma waʾl-hawān, wa-ṣāḥibuhu abadan yuʾahhilu 
nafsahu liʾl-umur al-ʿiẓām maʿa istiḥqāqihi lahā. In his translation of this passage, Zurayk renders the last 
phrase: he “is always preparing himself for great deeds”: Miskawayh 1968, 19. I think this is unsound on 
both counts (“preparing,” “deeds”), though it would take much textual argument to fully unpack the point. 
Most importantly, this passage needs to be compared with the corresponding passages of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which along with the treatise by Nicolaus, suggest themselves as key influences on 
this configuration of greatness of soul with its distinctive accent on merit and self-evaluation. The Arabic 
version of the NE reads: al-kabīr al-nafs huwa alladhī yuʾahhilu nafsahu liʾl-umūr al-ʿaẓīma wa-huwa li-
dhālika ahl (p. 257.10 of the Arabic edition). For the related remarks in Nicolaus’ treatise, see Aristotle 
1979, 408. The indeterminacy of “great things” is best preserved, but if were to determine it, the most 
natural way of doing so would be as a reference to honour given this context; reference to great action is 
present in the NE’s portrait of the megalopsychos (e.g. 1124b25), but it is not salient. Al-Ghazālī’s phrasing 
of his corresponding definition, which refers to despising (istiḥqār) these great things, lends further 
support to this view (al-Ghazālī 1964, 277), though it does so by throwing up a textual difficulty given the 
  
 One complication needs to be quickly mentioned and put aside: this list in fact contains 
not one, but two, concepts that speak to the “greatness of soul” complex. A few lines below, 
another virtue makes an appearance, designated through the compound ʿiẓam al-himma, which 
I will translate as “greatness of spirit.” The entry reads: “A virtue of the soul through which it 
endures both good fortune and its opposite, even the travails experienced at the time of death” 
(ibid).16 There is an important question to be asked as to the relationship between these two 
concepts. One thing seems clear: the latter concept foregrounds what I earlier identified as the 
second strand of greatness of soul, an attitude to external goods, and seems to frame the right 
stance to such goods in terms reminiscent of the Stoic approach. The correlation of greatness of 
soul with courage, we may note, was itself a characteristic Stoic move.17 
 I will be returning to the relationship between these two concepts in the sequel to this 
story. Putting this question aside for the moment, here I will restrict my attention to the first 
concept. How to parse it? Peering close, we will discern a focus on honour that seems 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s discussion in the Ethics, though we will also discern an emphasis on 
unconcern (“the capacity to bear honour and dishonour”) that seems rather less so.18 It is the 
last part of the statement that places the definition more decidedly in the Aristotelian force-
field, with its evocative references to self-judgement, worthiness, and desert. Yet what will also 
stand out is the terseness of the remark, one that leaves much room for ambiguity. What, for 
example, are the “great things” Miskawayh refers to as the correlate of worthiness? Reading the 
expression against Aristotle (and indeed against the vocabulary of the Arabic translation of the 
Ethics), the answer seems clear: honour.19 Yet Miskawayh notably does not volunteer this 
clarity. The words he does volunteer are, on any estimate, exiguous. Coming from the history of 
strained responses to greatness of soul in all its provocative brilliance, one will be struck by the 
sheer procedural matter-of-factness with which this virtue is casually brought up, briefly 
defined, and then dropped before moving down the list. The only other appearance the virtue 
makes in the rest of the work is in a passage addressing the impact of misfortunes on happiness, 
one that mirrors its appearance at the same juncture of the Nicomachean Ethics (Miskawayh 
1966, 96, cf. 99; compare NE 1100b32).20 
 What to make of this offhand treatment? Before engaging with this question more 
seriously, we need to allow it to deepen. We can do this by turning to another ethical work 
featuring a prominent discussion of the virtues, al-Ghazālī’s Scale of Action, whose composition 
dates a few decades after the Refinement. This is a work which claims our interest on a number 
of grounds, not only as one of the outstanding ethical treatises in the Arabic tradition attesting 
the influence of ancient ethical ideas, but also as the work of a thinker whose religious 
commitments stand out far more distinctly and whose accomplished engagement with 
philosophical ethics thus demands to be located more firmly within theological space. Al-
Ghazālī’s ethics in the Scale, as several commentators have highlighted, bears several debts. 
Among these, its debt to Miskawayh competes in force with its debt to the literary and religious 
scholar al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. before mid-11th century), whose seminal Pathway to the Noble 
                                                                                                                                                        
evident physical resemblance of the term istiḥqār (contempt) to Miskawayh’s istiḥqāq (merit). Another 
edition of the Tahdhīb in fact replaces istiḥqāq with a term close in meaning to al-Ghazālī’s, viz. istikhfāf 
(Miskawayh 1911, 17; it is not the sole textual discrepancy.) But any inclination to privilege the latter 
reading of the text must reckon with the fact that the former term appears both in the NE (e.g. p. 257.11 of 
Arabic edition) and in Nicolaus’ treatise. 
16 Huwa faḍīla liʾl-nafs taḥtamilu bihā saʿādat al-jadd wa-ḍiddihā ḥattā al-shadāʾid allatī takūnu ʿinda al-
mawt. Zurayk translates ʿiẓam al-himma as “composure,” which seems too restrictive in light of the uses 
of this term in other ethical texts, as I will show elsewhere. 
17 As noted by M. C. Lyons in Lyons 1960-61, 52; Lyons suggests that the terms kibar al-nafs and ʿiẓam al-
himma correspond to the Greek terms megalopsychia and megalophrosyne.  
18 Though note Aristotle’s remark at NE 1124a11: “he will treat dishonour in the same way…” 
19 See note 15. More could be said to unpack the somewhat cryptic reference to “disdain for what is 
insignificant,” but this would be a long textual story. The definitions of the virtue offered by different 
writers contain a few conceptual elements which my discussion has had to leave out of view. 
20 The term ʿiẓam al-himma is interestingly juxtaposed to kibar al-nafs in the first passage. 
  
Traits of the Religious Law had blazed the trail toward a more compelling amalgamation of 
philosophical ethics into a Qur’anic framework.21  
Each of these thinkers provides his own taxonomy of the virtues and vices, and the 
family resemblances between these taxonomies often co-exist with numerous divergences 
which no doubt provide the material for complicated stories about their individual 
genealogies.22 Yet whatever al-Ghazālī’s debt to al-Rāghib’s work, in his discussion of the virtues 
and vices, and in his discussion of greatness of soul in particular, it is his affinities with 
Miskawayh that advertise themselves most strongly—though these are indeed affinities that 
throw the delicate yet significant differences into even sharper relief. Unlike Miskawayh, al-
Ghazālī mentions not only the virtue but also its corresponding vices, naming them as smallness 
of soul (ṣighar al-nafs) and arrogance or presumption (takabbur).23 Unlike Miskawayh, he omits 
any reference to the second virtue, “greatness of spirit” (ʿiẓam al-himma). And here comes the 
formal definition, filed once again under the cardinal virtue of courage. Greatness of soul (kibar 
al-nafs): 
 
A virtue through which a person has the capacity to judge himself worthy of grand things 
while despising them and caring little about them out of delight in the value and grandeur of 
his soul. Its effect is that one takes little pleasure in great honours bestowed upon him by 
scholars and one takes no pleasure in honours bestowed by contemptible people, or in small 
things, or in good things that are a matter of luck or fortune (al-Ghazālī 1964, 277).24 
 
One thing that will instantly stand out are the rather firmer bridges this remark throws to 
Aristotle’s discussion, as evidenced by the resumption of Aristotle’s qualification about the 
great-souled man’s response to honour depending on the identity of its dispenser (NE 1124a5-
11). The similarities with Miskawayh’s account will be plain. They notably include the emphasis 
on worthiness of great things (complete with the same reticence on what those great things 
are), which highlights the second strand of greatness of soul identified earlier—self-
evaluation—and likewise situates al-Ghazālī’s definition within the Aristotelian force-field. At 
the same time, al-Ghazālī incorporates a stronger emphasis on the second strand, the attitude to 
luck; he also calls sharper attention to the element of self-evaluation by highlighting the double 
movement of exaltation of the self and contempt for things external to it.25  
 What such a painstaking comparison of differentiae points to, however, is the similarity 
between the two discussions that is most basic—and to the reader approaching these 
discussions with an awareness of the broader history of the virtue, most surprising: and this is 
just how impassively and cursorily both writers pick up greatness of soul only to drop it in their 
forward-moving march down their table of definitions. The space al-Ghazālī devotes to this 
virtue exceeds the space he allocates to most other virtues, and it is almost double the size of 
Miskawayh’s. Yet that is to say very little given the brevity of both sets of remarks. 
 Yet what makes this offhand brevity even more striking is that, even in their terseness, 
these statements have succeeded in giving voice to a conception of the virtue that places some 
of its starkest, and indeed most contentious, features on full display. It is al-Ghazālī’s statement 
that stands out here with the almost gratuitous extravagance of its wording, picking out the 
element of self-evaluation to parse it as the great-souled man’s “delight in the value and 
                                                 
21 Al-Ghazālī’s debt to al-Rāghib has been emphasised by a number of writers, including Madelung 1974 
and Mohamed 1995 and 2011. 
22 Among many other differences, al-Rāghib’s focal term is kibar al-himma. For a quick comparison of the 
tables of the virtues provided by some of our writers (al-Ghazālī, Miskawayh and Avicenna, though not al-
Rāghib), see Sherif 1975, appendix II. 
23 Though note that al-Ghazālī gives the term tabajjuḥ as the corresponding vice a couple of pages later 
(al-Ghazālī 1964, 279). 
24 Faḍīla yaqdiru bihā al-insān an yuʾahhila nafsahu liʾl-umūr al-jalīla maʿa istiḥqārihi lahā wa-qillat 
mubālātihi bihā ibtihājan minhu bi-qadr nafsihi wa-jalālatihā (…). 
25 For more on this double movement, see Vasalou 2013, 181-88, and more briefly Vasalou 2015, 160-61. 
  
grandeur his soul.” The grandeur of his soul; or as an alternative translation might have it: its 
majesty. For readers familiar with the strained history of this virtue’s reception, such electric 
terms will have the effect of returning them to the grounds of this reception and to the pangs of 
moral discomfort the virtue has provoked among many thinkers, particularly in its Aristotelian 
articulation. This discomfort has centred on the attitude to the self and the view of the proper 
way of relating to its merits that it appears to codify; and it has been especially high among 
thinkers whose religious commitments have led them to accentuate the value of humility as an 
ethical ideal. Given the intellectual identities of both writers, and even more so al-Ghazālī’s, their 
appearance of extending a matter-of-course welcome to this virtue will thus make us wonder, 
and will call for deeper investigation.  
 
 
The ethics of honour and self-esteem: Miskawayh 
 
It is an investigation, I would suggest, that requires placing these brief remarks in a more 
thorough conversation with these thinkers’ broader ethical schemes. And to the extent that one 
of the main (and most contentious) ethical stakes thematised by the virtue centres on the 
proper attitude to self-esteem and to the esteem bestowed by others, it is with these thinkers’ 
views on those topics that their statements about greatness of soul need to be placed in the 
closest contact. The path to investigating the Arabic reception of this virtue thus passes through 
an invitation to piece together a more positive and substantive picture of these thinkers’ ethical 
commitments. My focus will in fact principally fall on al-Ghazālī, who provides the richest 
though not the most unequivocal contributions on the topic, and whose theological 
commitments give him a higher stake in the subject. My argument, to briefly preview it, is that 
on closer scrutiny, the virtue of greatness of soul turns out to sit uneasily within these thinkers’ 
positive morality, particularly al-Ghazālī’s, for reasons that evoke the ones that animated some 
of their Christian counterparts in their response to pagan ethics and greatness of soul in 
particular. The conflict with (one important strand of) Islamic religious morality seems no less 
real for being unvoiced, though if this is the case, it will then be an interesting question to ask 
why the conflict should be obscured from view. 
 Miskawayh’s broader work offers little sustained commentary on the ethical stakes just 
isolated, and indeed some of the views he voices may put us in the mind of the ethical register 
texturing the ancient schemes in which the virtue of greatness of soul thrived. Thus, the simple 
affirmations of the dignity of human beings that are woven through his Refinement of 
Character—the soul is “nobler” in substance (akram jawharan) than all material things and 
humans have the greatest dignity among mundane beings (ashraf mawjūdāt ʿālaminā) 
(Miskawayh 1966, 6, 36)—may remind us, minus the specific vocabulary of grandeur, of some 
of the exulting expressions of human greatness among Stoic thinkers. As Seneca puts it in one of 
his Epistles (102, 21): “The human soul is a great and noble thing.”26 No less important, 
Miskawayh, as some have observed, fails to follow al-Fārābī’s example with regard to humility 
and gives it no place in his classification of the virtues.27 
Yet a closer look at a number of his remarks—isolated yet no less telling—yields a 
complex picture that raises questions about the position that greatness of soul, particularly in 
its Aristotelian modulation of the proper attitudes to honour and self-evaluation, could occupy 
within it. As regards externally bestowed honour, for one, Miskawayh’s moral exemplar is a 
person whose pursuit of excellence for its own sake can survive others’ complete ignorance 
about his merit (though Miskawayh underlines that virtues “shine like the sun” and in practice 
rarely remain undiscovered). The right attitude to others’ failure to recognise one’s merit, he 
tells us at one place, is indifference: one “should be unconcerned (lam yaktarith)”; he continues: 
“for we know that it is a vice to seek to obtain and to love honour (iltimās al-karāma wa-
maḥabbatuhā radhīla).” While Miskawayh recognises the motivational value of honour and 
                                                 
26 Here I draw on the translation by Gummere 1918-25.  
27 See Sherif 1975, 53-54, for some brief but helpful remarks on the topic. 
  
commends its pedagogical use as an incentive among those cultivating virtue, he disparages the 
desire for it as a vice.28 This last set of remarks is consistent with the guarded attitude to honour 
expressed in the first part of Miskawayh’s definition of greatness of soul (it involves “the 
capacity to bear honour and dishonour”), yet it is rather less consistent with Aristotle’s own 
framing of the proper attitude to honour, to the extent that this fought shy of Socratic (and later 
Stoic) indifference. Similarly, unlike Aristotle’s great-souled man, who—if he does not actively 
“look down on people” in general (NE 1124b5), makes a point of acting grandly toward the 
eminent (1124b18-19)—Miskawayh’s paragon of virtue is explicitly said to be one who 
“behaves humbly toward everyone (yatawāḍaʿu li-kull aḥad) and honours everyone he consorts 
with (yukrimu kulla man ʿāsharahu)” (Miskawayh 1966, 60).29 
Even more telling, however, are those of Miskawayh’s remarks that touch upon the 
internal element of the “ethics of esteem” plexus, that which concerns a person’s own estimation 
of his merits. In this respect, the significance of Miskawayh’s failure to include humility in his list 
of the virtues needs to be calibrated by the observation that a quality which presents itself as 
the opposing vice does indeed make an important appearance in his discussion. In a later 
chapter of the Refinement dedicated to discussion of the maladies of the soul, one of the vices 
that Miskawayh brings up is conceit (ʿujb), which he defines as “a false view that the soul 
deserves a station it does not deserve (ẓann kādhib biʾl-nafs fī istiḥqāq martaba ghayr 
mustaḥaqqa lahā)” (Miskawayh 1966, 196).30 The invocation of the notion of desert will remind 
us of Miskawayh’s use of the same term in his definition of greatness of soul. The conceited 
person, we learn, is the one who has an exaggerated view of his deserts; the virtuous person, by 
implication, will be the one who takes a just view of his deserts, and who thus only judges them 
to be great when they really are great (as the great-souled man does). Yet Miskawayh’s 
continuation, which proposes a reflection intended to medicate or remedy the vice, is 
suggestive: “It befits one who knows his soul to know the multiplicity of flaws and deficiencies 
that beset it.” And it is suggestive for apparently leaving little room for the possibility that self-
knowledge could ever yield a judgement of great merit—that it could ever produce legitimate 
self-satisfaction.31  
If this remark does not seem sufficiently conclusive, a pregnant statement Miskawayh 
offers in another of his works, The Scattered and the Gathered, drives the point more forcefully 
home. It is pregnant not least in appealing to a term that has already appeared once in this 
discussion, “greatness of spirit,” and whose fuller exploration I have deferred to another 
occasion. “The great-spirited person (al-kabīr al-himma),” Miskawayh tells us there, “belittles 
the virtues he possesses on account of his aspiration to what surpasses them; for however high 
the level (martaba) of excellence that a person acquires, it is nugatory compared with that 
which surpasses it”; and it is the limitations of human nature that “prevent one from grasping it 
fully and attaining its utmost degree” and “seeking the highest level of the human excellences” 
(Miskawayh and al-Tawḥīdī 1951, 308). It is a part of virtue, Miskawayh suggests—indeed, part 
of a virtue of greatness—to never feel satisfied with the excellence of one’s character; because 
complete perfection in fact lies outside our reach. The proper attitude toward one’s own 
character is never a static sense of possession such as Aristotle’s great-souled man appears to 
                                                 
28 For the last quote, see Miskawayh and al-Tawḥīdī 1951, 300; and see 307 for the remark about 
excellences shining like the sun (though see also 303 for a seemingly more positive comment on honour). 
On the pedagogical harnessing of honour, see e.g. Miskawayh 1966, 56 (talking about the education of the 
young).  
29 As Pakaluk argues in the context of broader remarks engaging the putative “arrogance” of Aristotle’s 
megalopsychos, the translation of kataphronei as “looks down on people” is misleading insofar as it 
introduces an object that the original text lacks. Pakaluk 2004, 264. 
30 This vice appears more specifically in Miskawayh’s discussion of anger, where it is named as one of the 
causes of its pathology; we may recall that greatness of soul was also subsumed into the irascible faculty. 
31 Miskawayh offers a second, slightly less transparent therapeutic reflection, which seems to centre on 
one’s dependence on others and the lack of self-sufficiency of one’s virtue.  
  
evince. Moral greatness must always figure in the content of a future-directed aspiration rather 
than as the content of a factual judgement about one’s existing character.32 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the virtue of greatness of soul, particularly in 
its Aristotelian inflection, could at best occupy an ambivalent place in Miskawayh’s broader 
ethical scheme. Although Miskawayh allows for the importance of proper self-respect—one 
should not gratuitously expose himself to ridicule and dishonor, he notes at one place: “the 
virtuous person…honours himself and protects his dignity (yukrimu nafsahu wa-ʿirdahu)” 
(Miskawayh 1966, 199)—his overall understanding would seem to bear an awkward 
relationship to the view of the proper attitude to honour and self-esteem embedded in 
Aristotle’s account. 
 
 
The ethics of honour and self-esteem: al-Ghazālī 
 
In crafting this comparison, I have held Miskawayh ethical viewpoint against (a rudimentary 
schema of) Aristotle’s while allowing myself the liberty to look away from Miskawayh’s own 
schema of the virtue, whose bare simplicity, and indeed strategic ambiguities, make it a limited 
mirror of Aristotle’s account and present its contentious elements in a relatively muted form.33 
In turning to al-Ghazālī, such textual scruples loosen their grip given the boldness with which 
such elements are placed on display. The great-souled man judges himself “worthy of grand 
things” while disdaining them “out of delight in the value and grandeur of his soul.” 
Now in seeking to situate this remarkable characterisation within al-Ghazālī’s broader 
ethical understanding, it will be instructive to note that this is not the first time that al-Ghazālī 
has linked the notion of a positive affective response to a person’s perception of his own 
character and of the quality of his soul within the pages of the Scale. Envisaging the life of 
sustained religious obedience a few pages earlier, al-Ghazālī makes the tantalising remark that 
fulfilling this life will lead to greater reward and a state of greater purity for the soul, such that 
“its perfection (kamāl) is more complete, and the joy its owner takes in its beauty (ibtihāj 
ṣāḥibihā bi-jamālihā) upon release from the attachments of the body is more intense and 
abundant.” This point is echoed later in the Scale where al-Ghazālī refers to the way the veil that 
prevents a person from “perceiving his soul and its perfection and beauty (mushāhadat nafsihi 
wa-kamālihā wa-jamālihā)” will be lifted upon death, allowing one to witness one’s perfection 
and to “rejoice in it and experience never-ending bliss in it” (al-Ghazālī 1964, 256, 357). The 
focal terms here, it will be observed, are “perfection” and “beauty.” These are notions that are 
organically interrelated and in turn directly linked with both the concept of character and with 
the more solemn notion of “grandeur” deployed in al-Ghazālī’s remark about greatness of soul. 
The notion of beauty, al-Ghazālī explains in the Revival of the Religious Sciences, is not confined 
to things we can perceive with the physical senses but has wider application. In this wider 
sense, an entity is beautiful when it is characterised by the perfection that is proper to it and 
possible for it. It is in this wider sense, in which beauty is predicated not of the “outer” but of the 
“inner” form, that we speak of beautiful or fine character (khuluq ḥasan, akhlāq jamīla) (see the 
discussion in al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 14: 2577-81). Having linked the good to the 
beautiful—a link indeed catalysed by the very Arabic term ḥusn, which can signify both 
“goodness” and “beauty,” and evoking a conceptual conjunction that was likewise central to the 
pattern of Greek ethics—elsewhere al-Ghazālī links the beautiful to the great by suggesting that 
                                                 
32 Note that the understanding of Aristotle’s megalopsychos in terms of “a static sense of possession” is 
open to debate. For a robust defense of the role of aspiration in Aristotle’s portrait, see Pakaluk 2004; cf. 
the discussion in Vasalou 2013, 184-86. 
33 This reflects a broader picture of sketchy engagement with the NE which has been the source of 
enduring doubts as to the precise identity of the texts Miskawayh was using during his composition of the 
Tahdhīb, and as to whether he had access to the entire text of the NE or was instead using the Summa 
Alexandrinorum under the mistaken impression that this was the NE. See the brief remarks in Akasoy 
2012, 101-102 and references there.  
  
beauty (jamāl) is but the subjective correlate of grandeur or majesty (jalāl) (al-Ghazālī 1971, 
126). 
 This last suggestion appears in a short but important work that al-Ghazālī devotes to an 
investigation of the names of God, The Most Exalted Aim in Expounding God’s Beautiful Names. 
This is a work whose distinctive task is to offer guidance to the believer striving to model 
himself on the divine names and to fulfil the religious mandate indicated in a well-known hadith 
to “assume the character traits of God” (takhallaqū bi-akhlāq Allāh). For our context, it will be 
particularly relevant to note the appearance that the notions of beauty and majesty make in al-
Ghazālī’s framing of this ethical pursuit. The person who has gained insight into one of the 
attributes of God is struck by its grandeur and splendour (istiʿẓām, istishrāq) in a way that fills 
him with “a longing for that attribute, an ardour for that grandeur and beauty, and a desire to be 
adorned by that feature” (ibid, 43).34 It is the perception of God’s beauty and majesty, this 
suggests, that rouses our moral aspiration and drives us to imitate it; and what is crucial is that, 
in responding to that stimulus, it is the desire to be beautiful—a longing to appropriate that 
beauty as our own—that forms the content of our moral motivation. Elsewhere the same point 
is couched using the language of perfection, appearing as the claim that “the perfection and 
virtue of one’s soul” should form the content of one’s aim in the mundane world (al-Ghazālī 
1964, 361). 
 Taken together, the above suggests that al-Ghazālī’s pithy statements about the great-
souled person’s delight in his own greatness betoken—and mesh with—a broader readiness to 
give ethical sanction to the idea that the perfections of one’s own character might show up as 
the object of positive valuation. This indeed reflects a psychological truth that al-Ghazālī states 
in universal tones in the Revival: perfection forms an object of desire, and the attainment of 
objects of desire causes pleasure; thus “when the soul perceives its perfection it is gladdened 
and moved by joy” (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1847).35 The picture of moral aspiration 
as a self-focused desire for one’s future perfection would appear to tie into this larger picture. It 
will not be incidental to further observe that in his classification of the virtues and vices in the 
Scale, al-Ghazālī, like Miskawayh before him, not only fails to incorporate humility (tawāḍuʿ) 
among the virtues, but unlike Miskawayh, goes further in identifying humility as one of the 
vicious extremes of a virtue named as “dignity” (waqār) and defined, in terms highly reminiscent 
of greatness of soul, as “assigning one’s soul the status it deserves due to one’s knowledge of its 
worth (qadr)” (al-Ghazālī 1964, 277-78).36 And whatever we make of Miskawayh or Fārābī’s 
stance on the topic, this understanding of the proper way of relating to one’s merits would in 
turn appear to connect al-Ghazālī to a view finding voice among other stakeholders in the same 
ethical tradition, albeit with varying degrees of directness. These include the Christian 
philosopher Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 974) who, opening his own work on the virtues, The Refinement 
of Character, would commend it both to the reader who lacks the virtues, but also to the one 
who possesses them and who can thus taste “a wondrous pleasure and delighting joy” upon 
recognising his own perfections in the ethical ideal extolled in the work (Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī 1978, 
70).37 The Shi’ite writer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) would later echo this thought in the 
overture to his celebrated compendium, The Nasirean Ethics (al-Ṭūsī 2015, 90). 
                                                 
34 Cf. the phrasing of 44: al-taḥallī bi-maḥāsinihā. See also the remarks about God’s beauty as the stimulus 
of ethical pursuit in al-Ghazālī 1964, 402-3. The virtue of noble-mindedness (shahāma) as limned in the 
Mīzān also appears to incorporate a desire for beauty in the content of motivation. It is defined as 
“alacrity for great deeds in the expectation of beauty (al-jamāl)”; ibid, 277. Miskawayh, interestingly, has 
“a fine/beautiful reputation” instead (uḥdūtha jamīla: Miskawayh 1966, 22). 
35 The context, importantly, is a discussion of the reasons we take pleasure in praise. 
36 An alternative translation for waqār might be “gravitas.” Sherif’s translation as “correct evaluation of 
self” (Sherif 1975, 53) seems infelicitous, inter alia, in insulating the term from its ordinary linguistic 
meaning. Yet note the apparently praising reference to humility in al-Ghazālī 1964, 252. 
37 This joy is compared to the pleasure taken in praise. Yet in fact Yaḥyā, like al-Ghazālī (as we will see), 
turns out to take a more qualified view of the ethics of self-esteem, reserving strong words against the 
vice of arrogance, which involves a sense of one’s grandeur and satisfaction in one’s virtue: see ibid, 96-
  
 Yet this understanding of the broader ethical tendencies animating al-Ghazālī’s thought 
in this domain turns out, on closer consideration, to carry tensions that make it difficult to 
simply rest with it. The invocation of the notion of merit or desert (istiḥqāq) in al-Ghazālī’s 
statements about the virtues of dignity and greatness of soul should be one of the first things to 
give us pause, given what we know about al-Ghazālī’s theological identity. For among Ashʿarite 
theologians, who vociferously rejected the kind of moral objectivism defended by Muʿtazilite 
thinkers, the notion of moral desert had a highly contested status. Similarly, it will be noted that 
al-Ghazālī’s above remarks about the joyful perception of one’s beauty pertain to the 
posthumous domain. Yet of course this domain is governed by moral conditions so different 
from those of the mundane one—it is the domain in which ethical endeavour comes to a rest 
and its harvest can finally be enjoyed as a sure possession—as to raise a question, at the very 
least, whether the joyful contemplation of one’s soul in the next world could automatically 
translate into a model for the right relationship to one’s soul in this one. In the same vein, to 
acknowledge that we are driven by a desire for beauty is not the same as to assert that we 
should rejoice in the confident certainty that we have realised it. And even the lightest reading 
of al-Ghazālī’s theological remarks, including his remarks about beauty in the Revival, raises 
serious questions about how earnestly he might mean to ensconce the notions of perfection, 
beauty and indeed grandeur within the self-regard of human beings. For “perfection belongs to 
God alone,” he trenchantly declares in one place, with an exclusivity that recurs in a statement 
appearing in the same vicinity: “To Him belongs beauty and splendour, greatness and 
magnificence (al-ʿaẓama waʾl-kibriyāʾ)” (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 14: 2588). And again, in 
The Most Exalted Aim, invoking the term appearing in his definition of greatness of soul: “The 
only being that is absolutely great (jalīl) is God” (al-Ghazālī 1971, 126). Meditation on God’s 
greatness and majesty, we hear elsewhere in the Revival, is one of the chief spiritual tasks of the 
believer, and anyone who apprehends God’s majesty ceases to perceive beauty in any other 
being.38 
 Such observations will immediately make us wonder how deeply to read the significance 
of the brief remarks surveyed above, and how seriously to credit them as a guide to al-Ghazālī’s 
considered ethical views on the topic. Where to look for stronger evidence? The obvious place to 
turn is al-Ghazālī’s multi-volume magnum opus, the Revival of the Religious Sciences. Divided into 
two halves focusing respectively on the external and internal dimensions of the religious life, 
the second half of the Revival offers a detailed discussion of the ethical and spiritual traits that 
need to be cultivated and avoided within this life. Within this discussion, the topic of honour 
occupies a salient place, as do the ethical traits that concern the attitude to self-worth, with an 
entire book devoted to the former under the title On the Condemnation of Status and 
Dissimulation, and another book to the latter under the title On the Condemnation of Arrogance 
and Conceit.  
The relationship between al-Ghazālī’s ethical thought as expressed in the Scale and as 
expressed in the later Revival has been the subject of extensive commentary among al-Ghazālī’s 
readers, given the more overtly philosophical character of the former and the more palpable 
Sufi commitments of the latter. Al-Ghazālī’s description of his “spiritual crisis” in his celebrated 
autobiography, The Deliverer from Error, has drawn many readers toward an understanding of 
his intellectual development as one governed by decisive moments of rupture. Querying these 
traditional literal-minded readings of al-Ghazālī’s autobiography, recent scholarship has placed 
the accent on the stability of his intellectual commitments and the continuity between his 
ethical works, with one commentator describing the Scale as “a sort of first draft of the Revival” 
and suggesting that its key concepts and ethical views survive in the Revival “largely unchanged” 
                                                                                                                                                        
97. He also elsewhere dismisses the love of honour and praise as a vice, even while recognising that it has 
an important developmental role to play (ibid, 101). 
38 On the task of meditating on the greatness of God, see briefly Sherif’s remarks on tafakkur and fikr in 
Sherif 1975, 122-23; and for the next point, see al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 13: 2390.  
  
despite perceptible differences in both form and substance between the two works.39 In taking 
the Revival as a document that can be naturally placed in conversation with the Scale in piecing 
together a fuller picture of al-Ghazālī’s ethical views, my emphasis also falls on the continuities. 
Yet as we will see, this emphasis is compatible with keeping an open mind regarding the precise 
balance of continuities and discontinuities, and with remaining attuned to interpretive tensions 
between the two works; as it is compatible with remaining attuned to tensions to be found even 
within the body of a single work. 
 It is an attunement that is called into service from almost the very first pages of the 
remarkable account of honour that al-Ghazālī offers in his book On the Condemnation of Status 
and Dissimulation. In its basic or original sense, he notes in opening the book, status or standing 
(jāh) refers to fame. Yet this definition gives way to a rather more striking formulation a few 
pages later: the meaning of “status” is “possession of the minds of people, from whom one 
desires aggrandisation and obedience” (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1835).40 Possession; 
or in another, starker translation: “mastery.” The concept of mastery continues to play an 
organising role in al-Ghazālī’s ensuing exposition. To have status is to dispose over people’s 
minds in ways that allow one to use them in pursuit of one’s ends.41 Human minds submit to a 
person when they form the belief that he is characterised by certain perfections, a class that 
includes—notably for our purpose—good character but also physical strength, beauty, 
knowledge, and piety. The person who seeks status seeks to produce such beliefs with a view to 
producing the state of submission and subservience that results from them. Properly speaking, 
status is the internal state of judging and believing that constitutes status, which is then 
outwardly expressed through honour and different forms of service.  
 Coming from many other accounts of honour, this presentation will seem remarkable. 
Honour emerges here as a special kind of exercise of power; it is a form of mastery or 
domination, with all the violence these concepts evoke. To exact honour from people is indeed 
in a real sense to enslave them.42 This way of collapsing the quest for honour into the quest for 
power will appear particularly striking when set against some of the salient moments in the 
history of the Christian engagement with pagan ethics. It was a crucial distinction between these 
two drives, for example, that formed the backbone of Augustine’s proposal that pagans can 
develop virtue “insofar as they move from the pursuit of dominium, driven by the desire to 
impose their own will on others, to the pursuit of glory and honor” (Herdt 2008, 48). For there 
is a “clear difference between the desire for glory before men and the desire for domination,” he 
had observed, even if in practice there is a “slippery slope” from one to the other (Augustine 
2003, Bk V, §19, 212). It will also appear striking coming from Aristotle, for reasons that help 
bring out the structure of al-Ghazālī’s reasoning more distinctly. For in characterising honour as 
the greatest external good and “the one we mete out to the gods” (NE 1123b17-18) in his 
remarks about greatness of soul, Aristotle had suggested an understanding of honour as 
something possessing intrinsic value and desired for its own sake. Al-Ghazālī’s account, by 
contrast, reduces this value to purely instrumental terms: if we desire people to honour us, it is 
because we have other separate ends that this enables us to achieve and other goods we want to 
obtain. In this respect it is like money, which gives us access to an indefinite range of things we 
might happen to desire (the analogy is al-Ghazālī’s: 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1836). 
                                                 
39 The quoted remarks are respectively from Garden 2014, 31, and Garden 2015, 228. Garden offers a 
careful re-appraisal of al-Ghazālī’s autobiography drawing on an extensive body of recent work. Debates 
about al-Ghazālī’s continued commitment to the philosophical ethics articulated in the Mīzān date back 
several decades, as can be seen from the brief overview in Abul Quasem 1974, 111-12. They also provide 
the context for the above-cited study by Sherif, who stakes an implicit claim for al-Ghazālī’s continued 
philosophical commitments by seamlessly treating the Mīzān and the Iḥyāʾ as equal partners in building 
his account.  
40 Mulk al-qulūb al-maṭlūb taʿẓīmuhā wa-ṭāʿatuhā. 
41 Ibid: li-yastaʿmila bi-wāsiṭatihā arbābahā fī aghrāḍihi wa-maʾāribihi. 
42 The language is al-Ghazālī’s: “The seeker of status seeks to subjugate and enslave free men (yastariqqu 
al-aḥrāra wa-yastaʿbiduhum)” (ibid). 
  
 And it is in fact precisely this utilitarian view of honour that al-Ghazālī is next challenged 
to defend, giving him an opportunity to finesse his account, but also to introduce a new source 
of ambiguity or tension. For “it is an astounding thing about human nature,” an imaginary 
reader observes, that we find people treating both kinds of goods—money and honour—in 
ways that seem utterly resistant to such an instrumentalising construction. We see people 
insatiably hoarding possessions and amassing wealth that far outstrips their present and 
conceivable needs. In like manner, we see people eager to have their renown diffuse over the 
four corners of the earth, in places where it is inconceivable they will ever set foot and whose 
denizens they will never meet in order to profit from their obeisance (ibid, 10: 1837-38). Al-
Ghazālī responds by first querying the notion of possibility or conceivability deployed in this 
observation: what reason sees as inconceivable, anxiety deems far less so. Yet it is his second 
response—which he himself calls the “weightier” of the two—that will rather engage our 
interest, for it shows al-Ghazālī abandoning the utilitarian part of his argument and making a 
crucial concession to the truth of his reader’s observation. The spirit, he remarks, is “a lordly 
thing” (amr rabbānī), as indicated in the well-known Qur’anic verse: “The Spirit is of the bidding 
of my Lord” (17: 85).43 A lordly element forms one of the central constituents of human nature. 
This element expresses itself as a powerful desire for perfection for its own sake, which in turns 
manifests as an insatiable desire for domination (istīlāʾ) that is satisfied either by actually 
exercising power over existents or (where this is not possible) by making them objects of 
knowledge. Hence indeed our ardour for probing wondrous and mysterious things (asrār, 
ʿajāʾib); for “by knowing an object, one dominates it” (al-Ghazālī: 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 
1841).44 Our desire for honour is connected to this deeper drive, and represents a desire to 
exercise power over one of the two classes of mundane entities, namely souls, the other being 
bodies. 
 We may notice the striking Nietzschean overtones of al-Ghazālī’s understanding of 
wonder and the drive to knowledge. More relevantly, we will notice that in this account the 
conflation of the desire for honour and the desire for domination has not been expunged, but 
engraved even more deeply. What will be especially interesting, however, is to note the tension 
this account now seems to introduce into the status—and valuation—of this desire, one that 
derives from an important ambiguity about the status of the “lordly” element within his broader 
scheme. 
 This is not the first time the “lordly” or “masterly” (rabbānī or rubūbī) aspect of human 
nature has appeared in al-Ghazālī’s discussion. It appeared in an earlier book of the Revival 
where al-Ghazālī offered an overview of human nature by identifying four elements that enter 
into its constitution: the “predatory” (sabuʿī), the “beastly” (bahīmī), the “satanic” (shayṭānī) and 
the “lordly” (ibid, 8: 1356). This four-fold scheme echoes a more familiar tripartite scheme 
found in numerous works of Arabic philosophical ethics based on the Platonic distinction 
between the rational, spirited or irascible, and appetitive parts of the soul. Given the frequent 
identification, within these works, of the “predatory” aspect with the irascible faculty and of the 
“beastly” aspect with the appetitive faculty, the most intuitive way of reading al-Ghazālī’s 
“lordly” element is as another designation for the privileged faculty standing at the normative 
apex of this scheme, namely reason. This is a reading al-Ghazālī reinforces in several ways, not 
only by speaking positively about the need to subjugate all other elements to the “governance of 
the lordly attribute” (ibid, 8: 1358), but also by once again associating this element with the 
quest for truth and an insatiable drive to knowledge.45 As in the discussion we have seen, here 
                                                 
43 The term amr, as these translations reflect, is an equivocal one. 
44 Fiʾl-ʿilm istīlāʾ ʿalaʾl-maʿlūm; al-Ghazālī’s response extends from 10: 1838-41. In the above I am 
simplifying somewhat a complex and multifaceted discussion.  
45 Inter alia, al-Ghazālī compares the lordly aspect to a sage (with the other aspects compared to a dog, a 
pig and a demon) and connects it to reason (ʿaql); ibid, 8: 1356-57. This scheme evokes a similar (albeit 
not entirely identical) scheme found in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s work, which we know al-Ghazālī drew 
copiously on: al-Makkī 2001, 1: 251-52. Yet al-Makkī made it rather plainer than al-Ghazālī in this context 
that the lordly aspects must be subdued and replaced by the aspects of servitude (awṣāf al-ʿubūdiyya). 
  
too al-Ghazālī associates this element with a different kind of drive directed toward mastery, 
elevation and eminence (riʾāsa). A remark in this context stands out as particularly pregnant 
given the echo it provokes with the terms of al-Ghazālī’s statement about greatness of soul. 
When this aspect of human nature dominates, he states, one acquires “an entitlement (istiḥqāq) 
to pre-eminence over people due to the perfection and grandeur (jalāl) of knowledge” (ibid). 
The grounds of the positive valence apparently attaching to this element would seem to be 
reflected in its very designation. This is an aspect of our being that makes us share in something 
that belongs to God; it is the basis of our kinship with God. It is not incidental that this notion 
should appear in the first pages of al-Ghazālī’s The Most Exalted Aim, a work devoted precisely 
to the project of cultivating that kinship. It is by striving to acquire the divine traits, al-Ghazālī 
tells us, that “a person may become lordly” (al-Ghazālī 1971, 44).46 
 The lordly aspect of human nature thus appears to carry a distinct normative privilege; 
and the drive to mastery and honour, having been grounded in it, could be expected to reflect 
this. Yet a closer reading makes clear that this positive understanding is subject to important 
qualifications. And here, it is precisely al-Ghazālī’s approach to the second component of this 
lordly aspect—the drive to honour and mastery—that serves as the strongest interpretive lever. 
For there is no mistaking al-Ghazālī’s intention, in the unmistakably entitled book On the 
Condemnation of Status and Dissimulation, to subject the desire for honour to a scathing critique 
that unfolds on a number of separate levels. Some of the grounds of his critique are linked to the 
danger that this desire poses to our moral motivation. The love of honour renders us insincere, 
making us act out of a concern for how we appear before others and displacing the desire for 
God’s praise—which ought to be our real concern—with a desire for the praise of human 
beings. Yet some of al-Ghazālī’s other grounds are more tightly linked to his nuanced construal 
of this desire in terms of an instrumental and intrinsic drive to power, and indeed bring to the 
open certain important evaluative distinctions to be drawn within the lordly element of our 
being. For among the two intrinsic drives that constitute this element, the one to power and the 
one to knowledge, it is only the latter, al-Ghazālī explains in the continuation of his discussion, 
that represents a real perfection (kamāl ḥaqīqī), as it is the only perfection that endures in the 
next life (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1842-43).47 This is linked to another point. For 
insofar as the desire for honour is an instrumental one, deriving from the way it enables us to 
achieve separate ends through the mastery of others’ minds, its value will depend on the value 
of the goods obtained by its means. Al-Ghazālī’s analogy with money suggests that he has 
primarily mundane goods of a sensory kind in mind, whose pursuit is subjected to severe 
strictures within his ethical scheme (ibid, 10: 1836).48 These are strictures that his 
condemnation of honour directly reflects. A degree of esteem among our fellow beings is 
necessary for living in the world—and indeed a degree of attachment to it may form a necessary 
motivational stepping stone in moral development—but it should not exceed the modicum that 
enables us to cover our basic needs.49 
 The negative light trained on the lordly aspect of human nature through these 
distinctions becomes even sharper in other contexts, in ways that crucially transpose al-
Ghazālī’s critique of honour into a more decisive stance regarding the internal counterpart of 
the ethical stakes we have been examining, namely the proper attitude to self-worth and the 
ethics of self-evaluation. For in making us desire eminence and domination, al-Ghazālī observes 
when first introducing his fourfold scheme of human nature, this lordly element impels us to 
“loosen the yoke of servitude (ʿubūdiyya) and humility from our necks” (ibid, 8: 1356). Yet this is 
a yoke which, bondsmen of God that we are—in religious writings, the term ʿabd (slave) is the 
                                                 
46 Literally, “that a servant of God may become lordly (yaṣīru al-ʿabd rabbāniyyan).” 
47 It is also the only perfection that can be properly attributed to human beings, given that power is only 
properly attributed to God (10: 1843).  
48 Cf. the reference to the needs of the body (muhimmāt al-badan) on 10: 1843, though the preceding 
context also suggests a broader specification of the ends served. 
49 Al-Ghazālī’s allowance for the developmental value of the love of honour or eminence—its value as a 
transitional motivation that should eventually be superseded—is signalled e.g. in al-Ghazālī 1964, 365-66. 
  
commonest designation for “human being”—we cannot quite throw off. “The lordship that is in 
our nature,” al-Ghazālī explicitly declares elsewhere, is “the opposite of the servitude that we 
were commanded to” (ibid, 12: 2186). This, in fact, points to a tension within the project of 
imitating God that was already evident in the thought of the prominent Sufi writer to which al-
Ghazālī bore the greatest debt in composing the Revival, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 996). In his 
Nourishment of the Heart, al-Makki had touched upon the notion of imitating God and 
highlighted its significance for the religious life. Those who have the greatest love for God are 
“those who most excel in assuming His character traits (aḥsanuhum takhalluqan bi-akhlāqihi), 
such as knowledge, clemency, forgiveness,” among others. Yet he had then appeared to 
distinguish this from a different form of imitation, one qualified more negatively as a 
“contestation” of God’s exclusivity and connected to a different list of attributes. The attributes 
featured on this list included pride or a sense of one’s greatness (kibr), the desire for praise, and 
the love of self-sufficiency (al-Makkī 2001, 2: 1042-43). 
 Al-Makki’s implicit distinction between good and bad forms of imitation would find a 
crucial reflection in the architecture of al-Ghazālī’s The Most Exalted Aim, which is organised by 
a scrupulous differentiation between the way the divine names apply to God and the way they 
apply to human beings. Not all divine traits, this suggests, should form objects of human 
imitation; certain attributes that are virtues in God may be vices in human beings, and to seek to 
imitate them may be an unconscionable bid to participate in something that is properly divine. 
For our purposes, what is especially significant is that the list of traits offered by al-Makki 
includes a number of concepts thematised by ancient articulations of greatness of soul and 
speaking to the ethical field of esteem and self-esteem more specifically. Among these concepts, 
the most important to attend to will be the first, which I translated neutrally as a “sense of one’s 
greatness” to allow for its positive sense as applied to God. If a sense of one’s own greatness is 
appropriate to God, al-Makki’s remarks already indicate that it may not carry the same 
appropriateness when exhibited by human beings. The term kibr, which bears a positive sense 
when applied to God, will in turn carry a negative sense in the human context. Applied to human 
beings, in fact, kibr is the term that signifies the vice of excessive pride or arrogance. This is one 
of two concepts, alongside conceit (ʿujb), that organise al-Ghazālī’s discussion in that book of the 
Revival devoted to an investigation of the ethics of self-worth, On the Condemnation of Arrogance 
and Conceit, to which we now need to turn in order to place this ethics into fuller view and into 
fuller conversation with his remarks on greatness of soul.   
 Al-Ghazālī addresses these two vices seriatim, providing separate analyses for each. Yet 
it is clear that these qualities are deeply intermeshed, not only in a structural sense—conceit is 
formally identified as the cause of arrogance—but also in sharing in many of the key features of 
al-Ghazālī’s analysis, including the analysis of what makes them vicious, what is the means of 
remedying them, and what is the virtue that should replace them. Both qualities represent 
failures in the evaluative attitude to the self and flawed modes of relating to one’s merits. Given 
the root meaning of “arrogance” (literally “magnitude”), the sense of one’s greatness naturally 
figures more strongly in al-Ghazālī’s account of this vice, which he specifies in terms that 
crucially incorporate a comparative dimension. The arrogant person is not simply the person 
who deems himself great (yastaʿẓimu nafsahu), but the person who deems himself greater than 
others and judges his perfections (ṣifāt al-kamāl) to exceed others’ (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-
38], 11: 1946). This relational aspect is absent from the vice of conceit (literally “self-
admiration” or “self-amazement,” from the root meaning “amazement” or “wonder”). Yet it is 
again a relational aspect that organises al-Ghazālī’s specification of the latter, though this is a 
relation of a rather different kind and the vice consists not in its presence but precisely in its 
absence. Conceit is a sense of satisfaction and confidence in one’s perfections, or more broadly 
the blessings one enjoys, that fails to have regard for their origin. 
 Whatever the differences that separate these vices, what is crucial is that both 
fundamentally represent failures in knowledge and self-knowledge; and in both cases, it is a 
knowledge of the self in its relation to God that supplies the necessary corrective. Fresh from al-
Makkī’s remarks, we will instantly recognise one of the grounds that al-Ghazālī appeals to in 
mounting his critique of the vice of arrogance. “A sense of one’s greatness is befitting to God 
  
alone,” and thus the person who displays arrogance “has contested God’s claim over an attribute 
that only befits His majesty” (ibid, respectively 11: 1979 and 1951). The vice of arrogance will 
be uprooted by a knowledge of God that induces a proper appreciation of His greatness, 
combined with a knowledge of self that induces a proper appreciation of its insignificance. This 
is a knowledge that al-Ghazālī takes it upon himself to provide in broad brushstrokes at this 
juncture of the Revival by offering a sweeping portrait of the human condition which traces the 
long arc of human life from the absolute nothingness of non-existence, through to birth, to the 
different stages of development, to death, and on to resurrection and the day of Judgement, 
highlighting the powerful hand of God at every step of this narrative sub specie aeternitatis. It is 
a portrait that may remind readers in certain respects of Pascal’s grandiose exercise in 
astonishment when conjuring the “two infinites” in the Pensées. The effect is the same: to place 
us in a way that displaces us, bringing home our insignificance and dependence, and provoking 
in us a sense of humility, which forms the only appropriate moral response (see ibid, 11: 1969-
73).50 
 Several elements of al-Ghazālī’s confrontation of the cognitive basis of arrogance recur 
in his discussion of conceit, but there is a shift of emphasis that reflects the distinctive character 
of this vice. In turning to examine the latter, it will be worth observing that it is in fact conceit 
that constitutes the most direct interlocutor of Aristotle’s virtue of greatness, insofar as the 
latter was specified in absolute rather than comparative terms. With this in mind, it will be 
interesting to consider al-Ghazālī’s critique, which he prefaces with a more nuanced 
characterisation of the vice. Conceit relative to some perfection is realised when a person 
“rejoices in it and reposes his confidence in it, and when he rejoices in it under its aspect as a 
perfection or blessing or good or distinction, and not under its aspect as a gift from God and a 
blessing received from Him. Rather he rejoices in it insofar as it is a quality he possesses and is 
ascribed to him as his possession” (ibid, 11: 1991). Synopsising: conceit consists in judging a 
certain asset one possesses to be great (istiʿẓām) and placing one’s reliance in it (rukūn) while 
failing to ascribing it to its real giver, that is, God. Add another conceptual filament—a sense of 
entitlement (ḥaqq) to receive rewards and advantages from God—and you have the cognate 
vice of presumption (idlāl) (ibid, 11: 1991-92).  
 Having limned the nature of this vice more precisely, al-Ghazālī proceeds to a thorough 
demolition of its cognitive basis by a tour de force deconstruction of the notion of human 
authorship or responsibility embedded in it. Anyone who takes pride in his perfections because 
he believes they have their origin in him dwells, very simply, in the night of ignorance. All the 
elements of our being on which our action depends—whether the will or power that moves us, 
or the bodily parts we move—have been created in us by God in an act of undeserved and 
ungrounded beneficence. If anything should provoke our wonder or admiration, it is not our 
own perfections but God’s generosity in providing them to us, when indeed he has chosen to 
withhold them from others. The deterministic underpinnings of this response are hardly hidden 
from view; and indeed al-Ghazālī continues with an open avowal that ensures nobody could 
mistake them. “It was not you who acted when you acted; it was not you who prayed when you 
prayed.” In reality there is no agent other than God (lā fāʿila illā Allāh) (ibid, 11: 1993, 1995; and 
see 1992-97 for al-Ghazālī’s overall discussion). In a later book of the Revival devoted to the 
topic of gratitude, al-Ghazālī puts the same point using the concept of beauty as his focal term. 
“God bestowed beauty and God then gave praise…it is as though a king were to clear away the 
filth from his filthy servant, dress him in his finest clothes, and…then say to him, ‘How beautiful 
you are! How beautiful your clothes and how clean your face!” (ibid, 12: 2228-29).51 Given God’s 
ultimate responsibility for the beautiful aspects or perfections a person possesses, it is he who 
ultimately deserves praise and thanks for them. 
                                                 
50 I am simplifying al-Ghazālī’s account of the treatment of arrogance, which includes other cognitive 
strategies and also incorporates a behavioural component. Some of the cognitive strategies (e.g. the ones 
schematised on 11: 1981) have much in common with the strategies used to treat conceit. 
51 Cf. al-Ghazālī 1971, 126: all the beauty and perfection found in this world derives from God’s being. 
  
 Once we appreciate our dependence on God, in fact, we will realise that the right 
attitude to any perfections we happen to possess is not one of joyful confidence but of fear and 
trembling—a fearful perception of the fragility of our virtue. For what was given to us without 
reason can be equally easily taken away without reason. And given the distance that still 
separates our virtue from its happy consummation in the next life, any sense of safety will be 
premature until that threshold has been crossed. This latter point indeed forms the basis of al-
Ghazālī’s engagement with what I earlier described as the “psychological truth” that we take 
pleasure in our perfection. His normative response to this psychological fact is simply to deny 
that we should succumb to it. “We must not rejoice in [our perfection], because the conclusion 
(or “issue”: khātima) is unknown. For this entails joy because it draws one near to God, yet the 
danger of the conclusion remains. The fear of a bad conclusion should thus take the place of joy 
in anything that is found in the mundane world. The mundane world is a vale of sorrows and 
griefs, not a realm of joy and happiness” (ibid, 10: 1852-53).  
 There will be several things to note about this remarkable positioning. In identifying an 
overblown sense of security and false sense of self-ownership as the nub of this moral 
pathology, al-Ghazālī may remind us of a complaint often voiced against Aristotle’s portrait of 
the great-souled man: the troubling sense of possession with which he relates to his virtuous 
character, which combines with an inability to tolerate indebtedness to others that reflects an 
exaggerated sense of self-sufficiency and a broader failure to recognise his dependencies.52 By 
the same token, al-Ghazālī’s account may provoke an interesting comparison with some of the 
strategies that Christian writers would later adopt in seeking to reconcile this virtue with their 
own characteristic viewpoint on these dependencies. Thus, one of several moves that Aquinas’ 
would make in engaging with the virtue in the Summa Theologiae would be to anchor the notion 
of human greatness more firmly within a theological framework, focusing attention on what is 
great in a person in its status as a gift from God. As with al-Ghazālī, one consequence of this 
move was to effect a shift in the place of honour within the ethical landscape (and for Aquinas, 
within the architecture of magnanimity specifically); for seen in this light, any honour that is 
due to a person for his greatness ultimately redounds to God. As Augustine had earlier put it in 
The City of God, when a person recognises that it is from God that “man receives whatever in him 
is rightly deserving of praise,” his concern becomes that praise should be given not to himself 
but to God (Augustine 2003, V, §19, 212-13). Aquinas would join these recalibrations to another, 
modifying the great-souled man’s sense of his own greatness with a sense of humility that forms 
the natural corollary of this acknowledgement of dependence.53 
 The emphasis on humility will likewise already have stood out as a key feature of al-
Ghazālī’s ethical understanding. It is indeed humility that shapes his account of the proper way 
of relating to the self and its merits, and that constitutes the virtue that should take the place of 
the vices of self-esteem he outlines. Yet the terms in which he specifies this virtue, as the above 
will also have suggested, are so stark as to make one wonder what foothold it could still allow to 
any notion of human greatness. And here, looking away from Aquinas’ own delicate 
recalibrations, we should instead focus on the comparison of greater moment. For in casting 
arrogance and conceit as vices of self-knowledge, al-Ghazālī’s account resonates with Aristotle’s 
understanding of greatness of soul (and its corresponding vices) as I earlier characterised this. 
Yet if for Aristotle self-knowledge could support a judgement of one’s greatness, for al-Ghazālī, 
as his view emerges from these passages of the Revival, self-knowledge not only fails to support 
a judgement of one’s greatness—the only judgement it supports is a judgement of one’s 
baseness. The sweeping vista of the human condition that al-Ghazālī summons to drive such 
self-knowledge home characteristically terminates in an insight into “the worthlessness of one’s 
being” (khissat dhātihi). The raft of moral exercises he subsequently offers are intended to lead 
his reader to “regard himself with contempt” (yuḥaqqira nafsahu). “The higher a believer stands 
in God’s estimate,” he approvingly quotes a religious saying, “the lower he stands in his own.” 
                                                 
52 See briefly Herdt 2008, 41-43; as Herdt notes, there is some tension here given Aristotle’s sensitivity to 
these dependencies elsewhere. 
53 Aquinas’ discussion of magnanimity can be found in Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, q. 129. 
  
And again, using terms that will seem especially pregnant: God said, “You have worth (qadr) in 
our sight so long as you assign yourself none” (respectively, al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 11: 
1971, 1975, 1943, 1959).  It is not that the term “great” could not be applied to human beings at 
all within this outlook. But it will be applied precisely to the humble; and as the quoted remarks 
already suggest, it will be applied not from their perspective, but from God’s. “The one who is 
great (kabīr) is the one who is great in God’s estimate in the hereafter” (ibid, 11: 1980).54 
 In the Scale, al-Ghazālī had referred with apparent approval to the delight the great-
souled man takes in the value (qadr) of his soul; in these pages of the Revival, he denies one 
could ever rightfully assign oneself any. In the Scale, he had spoken with apparent approval of a 
positive sense of self-worth founded on one’s proper deserts; here any such moderating 
perspective seems absent.55 Taken together, everything we have seen attests a fundamental 
tension between the view of honour and self-esteem expounded by al-Ghazālī in his major 
ethical work, the Revival, and the view embedded in the ancient virtue of greatness of soul, 
particularly in its Aristotelian articulation. Discounting certain sources of ambivalence, his view 
of honour is overwhelmingly negative; his view of how one should relate to one’s merits 
dominated by an emphasis on their deprecation.  
 
 
An ethical conflict and its eclipse  
 
The conversation between the two sets of views, it should be noted, is not a seamless one, and 
there are differences of emphasis between them which reflect profound divergences in 
intellectual outlook and which should not be disregarded. For example, al-Ghazālī’s criticism of 
the pleasure deriving from an awareness of one’s perfection (“we must not rejoice in it because 
the conclusion is unknown”) will seem striking coming from Aristotle’s account, which his terms 
otherwise appear to directly engage, in the emphasis it places on future consequences and in 
viewing them as a factor that can enter into the evaluation of actual present perfection. This, of 
course, reflects a crucial feature of al-Ghazālī’s religious metaphysics, in which perfections and 
imperfections are indissolubly linked to specific otherworldly outcomes. This point ties into an 
even broader observation which concerns the content of the concept of “perfection” that 
organises al-Ghazālī’s account. Even though ethical character forms a central preoccupation of 
the Revival, one of the most surprising features of his discussion of the ethics of self-esteem is 
how rarely he brings it up in specifying the perfections that are engaged in a person’s self-
assessment. The most important (genuine) perfections highlighted in his discussion are 
knowledge (ʿilm), piety (waraʿ), worship (ʿibāda) and action (ʿamal) (see, indicatively, al-Ghazālī 
1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1852; 11: 1992). It is not that character is formally excluded by the 
terms of this list. This list can in fact be mapped on to a basic categorial division that is pivotal to 
al-Ghazālī’s conceptual landscape—as indeed to Islamic ethical culture as a whole—according to 
which the field of what is “morally relevant” is carved into two main domains, knowledge and 
                                                 
54 Cf. 1959, using the alternative term ʿaẓīm (“great”) to suggest: the person who is great is the one who 
does not think himself great or greater than others. Compare the rather more stipulative-sounding 
remarks in the Maqṣad regarding the application of the term kabīr to human beings (al-Ghazālī 1971, 
119). 
55 It might be thought that precisely such a moderating perspective is offered in a brief section at the end 
of al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the vice of arrogance (1356–57 [1937-38], 11: 1987-88), where he suddenly 
appears to recollect the Aristotelian principle of the mean and offers to locate the virtue of humility 
against not only the vice of excessive self-regard, but also against a vice of excessive self-abasement. The 
terms he uses for the latter are takhāsus and madhalla. Yet what is striking is that he appears to tie this 
concept narrowly to external behaviour—behaviour that is degrading insofar as it violates something we 
might call social status or dignity, as when the scholar man leaps up to offer his seat to the shoemaker and 
treats the latter with lavish deference—and he provides no indication that there is a vice of thinking too 
poorly of oneself on the internal level.  
  
action. Character is formally subsumed in the latter category.56 This categorial move carries 
evident awkwardness, and in fact despite this formal inclusion, direct references to character in 
specifying the notion of “perfection” are few and far between. And given the way in which moral 
character is out-privileged by knowledge—it is a perfection that is ultimately valued merely 
instrumentally, as a means to knowledge, and construed merely negatively, as freedom from 
animal drives and detachment from worldly concerns57—one cannot help thinking that an 
element which played an important role in the architecture of Aristotle’s profile of the 
megalopsychos has undergone significant displacement, so much indeed as to raise real 
questions about the exact extent of the conversation taking place between these schemes.  
Yet if we prescind from such questions here and focus on the essentials of al-Ghazālī’s 
account, the conflict between al-Ghazālī’s views of esteem and self-esteem and ancient views 
inscribed into the virtue of greatness of soul seems open and direct. What will seem remarkable 
given this open conflict is that al-Ghazālī himself never confronts it. And this will seem doubly 
remarkable given the way in which his very own language often drives him repeatedly up 
against it. 
Readers may already have picked up on an interesting linguistic affinity between the 
term used to signify greatness of soul (kibar al-nafs) and the term signifying arrogance or pride 
(kibr). The affinity is suggestive; and among the thoughts it suggests is one I voiced earlier when 
first situating the Arabic reception of greatness of soul in a field of expectations, and indeed of 
heightened curiosity. Here was a culture that lacked the concept of megalopsychia, suddenly 
confronting another which contained it. How would it find the conceptual and linguistic 
resources to absorb it? Given the cultural contingency the concept has often been seen to carry, 
this confrontation would seem to have the makings of a collision. It is a collision, of course, 
taking place on a grand scale in the early centuries of the Islamic world, which set itself the task 
of absorbing a monumental body of philosophical and scientific literature from Greek and Syriac 
sources from the 8th to the 10th centuries. Translators of these texts had to negotiate the 
challenge of bridging the “cultural gap dividing ancient Greece from medieval Iraq” case by 
case.58 The success of this undertaking depended on the ability to draw on the existing 
resources of the language even while expanding its boundaries, and it could hardly leave the 
language unchanged. One can see this process of boundary-pushing transformation on display 
in many of the key literary monuments of the translation movement, including, as Manfred 
Ullmann observes, in the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics.59 
This is the broader context in which to locate the particular encounter with 
megalopsychia. Yet one wonders whether, even in a language undergoing seismic changes, some 
of these changes would prove harder to absorb than others, and whether some of the semantic 
freight carried by the linguistic resources mobilised would complicate the progress of a 
particular graft. It is a question one raises, certainly, with regard to the Arabic absorption of the 
virtue of megalopsychia through the simple calque kibar al-nafs, given the awkward contiguity it 
produces with a term carrying far more negative ethical connotations. The term kibar al-nafs, 
signifying a sense of one’s greatness understood as a virtue, lies only a morphological whisker 
away from the term kibr, signifying a sense of one’s greatness understood as a vice. Given this 
background—given an awareness of both the cultural specificity of the concept and of the 
potential tensions brooked by its Arabic accommodation—one watches eagerly for an explicit 
                                                 
56 This is signalled clearly by al-Ghazālī in al-Ghazālī 1964, 192, where he explains the term “action” 
(ʿamal) in terms of regulating the appetites and controlling anger and subjecting these two drives to 
reason—which is what good character essentially comes down to in his account. Cf. Sherif 1975, 8. 
57 The instrumental and negative view of virtue is crystal-clear e.g. in al-Ghazālī 1964, 217 (though the 
issue admits further discussion). See also the stark remarks in al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 10: 1844, 
where the knowledge-action binary is replaced with a knowledge-freedom binary that accentuates the 
negative aspect of “virtue.”  
58 The remark is from Akasoy 2012, 90; and see the ensuing discussion for some examples of this kind of 
negotiation with regard to the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
59 See Ullmann’s remarks in Ullmann 2011, vol. 1, introduction, esp. 27-28. 
  
comment on the linguistic character of the term among its philosophical discussants. Among 
those who touch upon it, the only one who comes tantalisingly close to such comment is 
Avicenna (d. 1037) in his reprise of Aristotle’s above-cited passage of the Posterior Analytics, 
which is also one of the few occasions when he refers to the virtue. The terms in which Aristotle 
had set up the discussion in the Posterior Analytics—in order to define the concept, “we must 
consider individual great-souled persons whom we know, and see what one characteristic they 
all have qua great-souled”60—had made an implicit appeal to ordinary usage in presupposing 
the inquirer’s ability to make judgements about the appropriate application of the concept. Yet 
when he reprises the point in the Healing, Avicenna ignores the invitation to reflect on the 
linguistic status of the concept and simply rehearses Aristotle’s claim about people who are 
“described” (mawṣūfūn) or “called” (yusammā) great-souled without so much as a word about 
who exactly calls them that in his own times (Avicenna 1956, 316). Other writers who visit the 
concept either place it, like Miskawayh, in the segregated space of a definition without 
commenting on its relationship to ordinary speech, or less usually, like al-Fārābī, blend it into 
the flow of their speech with little to call attention to its linguistic particularity and to thematise 
its intelligibility to the average reader.  
Yet whatever we make of these other discussants, in the case of al-Ghazālī the potential 
tensions at stake are signalled with special intensity by his own linguistic usage, and by tremors 
rippling through the fabric of his own ethical speech. There are several moments in his 
discussion of arrogance in the Revival where the term kibr appears next to the term nafs in a 
close proximity that will make readers sit up and take notice. Arrogance, al-Ghazālī states at the 
opening of his discussion, refers to an internal characteristic rather than to outward behaviour. 
If there is no outward expression, “one says that a person has arrogance in his soul (fī nafsihi 
kibr).” “Arrogance and pride (al-kibr wa-ʿizzat al-nafs),” he writes in another place, close the 
doors of heaven (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 11: 1946, 1947). Yet even readers sensitised to 
these tremors may be astonished to see the term kibar al-nafs appear only a few pages later in 
full armour, in a statement that plainly marks the reversal of its positive signification and its 
assumption of the negative meaning attaching to its linguistic neighbour. When people become 
indignant on God’s behalf upon the sight of sinful behaviour, al-Ghazālī states, their motives are 
sometimes baser than they suppose, and it is often “arrogance (kibar al-nafs) and a 
presumptuous belief (idlāl) in their knowledge and piety” that drives them (ibid, 11: 1980). 
In the Revival, al-Ghazālī provides no commentary on greatness of soul in the manner of 
the Scale; yet greatness of soul certainly makes an appearance in his list of the virtues.61 The 
unmarked transition of kibar al-nafs from virtue to vice within the body of a single work will 
seem extraordinary. Yet more extraordinary will be the broader phenomenon it represents, and 
that is a distinct failure on al-Ghazālī’s part to thematise the existence of conflict where conflict 
would certainly appear to be found.62 In trying to understand al-Ghazālī’s complex relationship 
to philosophy, readers have often had recourse to the remarks made in his famous 
autobiography, The Deliverer from Error, where he had reviewed, in his own stylised way, the 
milestones of his intellectual career and his relationship to the key intellectual approaches 
competing for truth in his day. In spelling out his attitude to philosophy, al-Ghazālī’s concern 
had been to distance himself from the philosophical sciences and to highlight his commitments 
to Sufism. Recent readings of the Deliverer have suggested that this presentation was motivated 
by specific apologetic aims and furnishes a less than faithful reflection of al-Ghazālī’s intellectual 
commitments. Yet what is important is that even with this ostentatiously negative account, 
ethics had been singled out from among all other parts of the philosophical curriculum for a 
                                                 
60 I draw on the translation by Hugh Tredennick (Aristotle 1960), with modification.  
61 It does not appear in the first list of the virtues given in al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 8: 1358, but it 
appears in the second list, ibid, 8: 1437 (reading kibar instead of the edition’s kasr).  
62 It is a curious feature of one of the precious few scholarly discussions of this virtue in the Arabic 
tradition—Sherif’s remarks in Sherif 1975, 49-51—that it reaches the same conclusion as I have, albeit 
less emphatically (p51: greatness of soul does not “appeal” to al-Ghazālī), without making clear that this 
conclusion needs to be wrested from the texts and is not signposted by al-Ghazālī himself.  
  
particularly irenic treatment. Al-Ghazālī had underscored the consonance between 
philosophical ethics—notably philosophical accounts of the virtues and the vices—and the 
teachings of the mystics, and he had indeed claimed the higher ground by suggesting that such 
similarities in content were the result of the philosophers’ borrowings from the latter. Even 
when philosophical ethical teachings happened not to have their counterpart in religious 
writings, the attitude toward them was to be one of qualified acceptance subject to a basic 
assessment: “If they are reasonable in themselves and supported by proof, and if they do not 
contradict the Koran and the prophetic practice, then there is no reason to abstain from using 
them.”63  
This irenic treatment and indeed defence of philosophical ethics reflects al-Ghazālī’s 
heavy incorporation of philosophical material into his ethical work—a feature that, as 
commentators have observed, makes for the continuity between ethical works of otherwise 
diverging register, such as the Scale and the Revival. In including greatness of soul into his 
classification of the virtues, al-Ghazālī would appear to be implicitly denying that any 
contradiction like the one indicated in the Deliverer arose to place it beyond acceptance. The 
above discussion has called this into question, as it called into question, though with a softer 
touch, the harmony of this virtue with Miskawayh’s environing ethical scheme.  
In the case of al-Ghazālī, one might be tempted to remove the appearance of conflict by 
appealing to the chronology of his works—with the Scale usually dated before the Revival—to 
speculate about a change of intellectual viewpoint. Yet greatness of soul, as I have noted, 
appears in both works even if it only receives direct consideration in the former. One might also 
be tempted to remove it by appeal to the special context of al-Ghazālī’s discussion in the Revival. 
The book which served as our principal informant, it will be observed, was a book dedicated not 
to what I have been referring to as the “ethics of self-esteem” more broadly, but more narrowly 
to the class of vices within that field, and as such, governed by a therapeutic aim that would 
unavoidably influence its presentation. For as al-Ghazālī would suggest, echoing an insight of 
Aristotle’s, the effort to heal a vice may sometimes necessitate erring toward the opposite 
extreme.64 Al-Ghazālī’s failure to thematise a more positive concept of self-esteem may thus 
reflect the therapeutic character of his discussion, as also the fact that human beings are more 
likely to err in the direction of too much self-regard than in the direction of too little.  
Yet against this hypothesis one would have to stack a number of observations. Al-
Ghazālī’s disavowal, for one, of the notion of entitlement in his discussion of conceit—in tension 
with the role played by this notion in his positive virtues of self-esteem elsewhere—dovetails 
with a suspicion of moral desert that formed one of the hallmarks of the Ashʿarite theological 
viewpoint defended by al-Ghazālī in other works. Given the debates that have raged regarding 
the depth of al-Ghazālī’s Ashʿarite commitments, it might seem risky to place such interpretive 
weight on them for this purpose.65 Yet on this point, al-Ghazālī’s Ashʿarite viewpoint ties in with 
intellectual commitments so deeply engraved into his overall vision that it is hard not to take 
them as a central interpretive fulcrum. These include, above all, his deterministic understanding 
of the relationship between divine and human power, which receives eloquent expression 
across the Revival, and is at the root of his account not only of the need for humility but also of a 
number of other moral imperatives such as gratitude and trust (tawakkul) in God.66  
                                                 
63 See the nuanced discussion in al-Ghazālī 1967, 86-90; the quoted passage appears on p88. I use Sherif’s 
translation (Sherif 1975, 18) with one minor modification. 
64 This idea is present in al-Ghazālī’s remarks on the treatment of bad character in al-Ghazālī 1356–57 
[1937-38], 8: 1446-53; see e.g. the remarks about treating arrogance on 1449. Cf. Aristotle, NE 1109a30-
1109b7. 
65 Some of the most heated debates have centred on al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the concept of causality. 
See Griffel 2009 for discussion of these issues.  
66 To these considerations, one might add the simple observation that although al-Ghazālī indicated a 
more positive virtue of self-respect with regard to external behaviour in the Iḥyāʾ (see note 55), he 
refrained from extending this gesture to internal attitudes despite having registered the distinction 
between outer and inner plainly (al-Ghazālī 1356–57 [1937-38], 11: 1946). 
  
Yet if these attempts to clear away conflict are rejected, what alternatives remain? The 
presence of such unexplained and seemingly irreconcilable tensions will unavoidably bring to 
mind a sense of scepticism that these kinds of ethical works have often provoked when it comes 
to evaluating their philosophical quality or analytical depth. Oliver Leaman gives a 
characteristic statement of this scepticism—a statement indeed rather more persuasive than his 
attempt to counter it—when he remarks that treatises like Miskawayh’s strike readers at first 
sight as “rather banal” and “disappointing in their lack of philosophical sophistication and 
excess of syncretistic reasoning.” In such works we see “a mixture of ideas and arguments, a list 
of other people’s observations, and sometimes rather unexciting advice as to how one should 
conduct oneself…it is tempting to reject it as real philosophy and classify it with literature…with 
little if any philosophical interest” (Leaman 1996a, 160).67 It is not incidental, in this respect, to 
note that George Hourani, in his well-known classification of types of Islamic ethics along two 
axes—religious vs. secular, normative vs. analytic—placed the ethical works of Miskawayh and 
his successors, notably Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī, in the category of secular 
normative ethics, citing their derivativeness from the Greek tradition and lack of originality—
their framework “offers little of general philosophical interest that is new”—and their failure to 
engage the subject analytically (see Hourani 1985; 21 quoted). Hourani, it must be remarked, 
was operating with an excessively restricted conception of what it is to approach the subject 
analytically which reflects the biases of the moral philosophy of his time: ethical analysis 
proprement dit is the analysis of ethical terms. Yet even if we bracket this outmoded conception, 
his classification captures something important about the character of the works that formed 
our primary sources for the treatment of greatness of soul above, Miskawayh’s Refinement of 
Character and al-Ghazālī’s Scale of Action. This character in fact reaches its highest expression in 
the account of the virtues and vices provided in these works, which attests an all-consuming 
interest in the production of lists and definitions at the expense of deeper analysis, as if the task 
of ethical inquiry was complete once a virtue or vice had been slotted into a broader 
hierarchical structure and supplied with a satisfactory definition.68 
Seen in this light, Miskawayh’s and to a greater extent al-Ghazālī’s inclusion of greatness 
of soul in their list of virtues without thematising the conflict it poses to other elements of their 
ethical scheme might be taken as a symptom of the limitations of the analytical character of 
their work. Putting the point more negatively, one might describe it as a failure to fully 
rationalise and integrate received ideas and place them in full conversation with the constants 
of their overall scheme. Yet the fierce intelligence displayed by al-Ghazālī, for one, in critically 
confronting philosophical views in other works makes this negative reading harder to credit, 
and might make us reach for a more positive way of casting the point. One might thus take it to 
reveal something important about the nature of the intellectual task these authors saw 
themselves as pursuing in their works—about the reflective depth and indeed authorial 
originality they set themselves as their ideal. The stage-setting statement with which al-Ṭūsī 
would later open his own reworking of Miskawayh’s compendium here seems especially 
suggestive as one possible expression of the guiding ideal. All the elements of practical 
philosophy related in this book, he would write, “are by way of transmitting and reporting, and 
by manner of presenting and recounting, the views of the philosophers of ancient and recent 
times without venturing to declare which view is true and which view false and without 
undertaking to determine which opinion is most plausible and which doctrine false” (al-Ṭūsī 
2015, 29).  
This blanket disavowal of intellectual responsibility and renunciation of authorial voice 
may seem unconvincing as a total characterisation of al-Ṭūsī’s and his philosophically-minded 
                                                 
67 Cf. his remarks about Miskawayh’s work in the same volume: Leaman 1996b, 256-57. 
68 In this respect, it may be observed, these works reflect the character of some of the Greek texts 
available in Arabic translation as outlined earlier—short compendia, such as the treatise by Nicolaus or 
the De Virtutibus, in which the enumeration of the virtues and vices occupied an important place. To that 
extent this can be taken as further evidence of the stronger influence exercised by such texts as compared 
with better-known and more analytical works like Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
  
predecessors’ relationship to the material contained in their work, and it will grate with those 
who reject the dismissive view of these writers as “mere copyists.”69 In the case of al-Ghazālī, in 
particular, it will also be hard to reconcile with the intense sense of religious responsibility he 
displayed in engaging philosophical ideas over his career. Yet one can take it, more modestly, as 
flagging a feature of this genre of ethical reflection that constitutes what one might hesitantly 
call its own internal “standards of excellence,” and that serves to distinguish it from other 
genres of ethical reflection of a more analytical character, such as the one found in works of 
speculative theology (kalām), which both al-Ṭūsī and al-Ghazālī additionally engaged in. In the 
latter genre—distinguished, in terms of subject matter, by its overwhelmingly meta-ethical 
focus—the standards of excellence centred on the combative confrontation of opponents 
through high-octane analytical argument. In the genre of character-focused writing that writers 
like al-Ghazālī and Miskawayh participated in, by contrast, the core values constituting the 
standards of excellence centred not so much on critical argument and rational coherence, as on 
an attitude of appreciation and accommodation, and a concern to transmit received funds of 
ethical wisdom which need not necessarily entail scrutinising the relationship of every element 
to every other and subjecting every element to stringent critique. This, in turn, might be 
connected to the practical aims shaping these works, insofar as they aimed to have an effect on 
the moral life of their intelligent reader.70 In ethical works governed by such standards and 
looser security checks, one might say, certain lower-order elements might occasionally pass the 
gates which a more critical spirit would have screened out. 
This explanation will not satisfy everyone. Among the questions it provokes, one of the 
most interesting is how writers like al-Ghazālī and Miskawayh understood the status and 
significance, more specifically, of their classifications of the virtues and vices, which is the 
component of their works that gives the least evidence of higher-order critical reflection and 
that is also least easy to envisage serving a practical aim. One of the greatest obstacles to 
accepting this explanation is that it would challenge a conviction that exercises a magnetic effect 
over us as readers and interpreters, and that is the faith in a unified consistent viewpoint that is 
present among conflicting and ambiguous textual phenomena waiting to be discovered. This 
interpretive heuristic seems especially seductive in the case of a thinker as perspicacious yet 
also as elusive as al-Ghazālī, whose ambiguous pronouncements on a host of questions have 
often driven readers to the kind of task I pursued above—to a painstaking effort to place the 
different parts of his work into conversation and piece together a unified account of his “real” 
view. Taneli Kukkonen offers a particularly relevant expression of this stance in a recent essay 
devoted to an effort of this type, where he stakes a claim for there being a “theoretical backdrop 
at all to al-Ghazālī’s seemingly disjointed accounts of the various virtues and vices” and states 
that “a unitary account must undergird the different presentations given to our moral striving in 
various contexts, even if the exact formulation should prove elusive” (Kukkonen 2015, 140).71 
The distinction drawn above between different domains of ethical writing and their respective 
levels of reflective depth, if sound, would lead us to question this faith—even if in practice, such 
faith could only be abandoned after first pushing it as far as it will go. 
 
                                                 
69 As does Lenn E. Goodman vis-à-vis Miskawayh in Goodman 2003, 108. 
70 These aims are stated plainly by Miskawayh, for example, in Miskawayh 1966, 1, and they are reflected 
in the association of several of the works considered above with a genre of ethical writing identified as 
“propaedeutic” to philosophical learning and distinguished from a genre of higher-level ethical thought 
that presupposes such learning. See briefly Druart 1996 and references there. The point of course can 
only be pushed so far; Aristotle characterised his own aim in practical terms with little sacrifice of 
analytical depth. 
71 Kukkonen’s entire project in this paper is shaped by a methodological insistence on an analytical rather 
than “compilatory” or descriptive approach to al-Ghazālī’s thought which leans heavily on this heuristic. 
The special elusiveness of al-Ghazālī’s thought has been a central factor in the colossal amount of 
interpretive debate his work has attracted, but it should be kept in mind that it reflects a broader 
phenomenon that is pervasive in the field, as I have suggested in my study of the Muʿtazilites (Vasalou 
2008, esp. chapter 1) and also more recently of Ibn Taymiyya. See e.g., briefly, Vasalou 2016, 6-7, 16-21. 
  
 
Concluding reflections 
 
In this paper, my aim has been to train a searchlight on the Arabic reception of greatness of soul 
by studying its place in the work of two major figures, Miskawayh and al-Ghazālī, while also 
casting some sidelights on a number of other figures along the way. Both thinkers, as I have 
shown, allocate this virtue—as identified through the Arabic term kibar al-nafs—a distinct place 
in their taxonomies, specifying it in ways that evoke several of the conceptual strands featuring 
in ancient configurations of the virtue, and that notably include an Aristotelian emphasis on the 
agent’s self-evaluation and relationship to his merits. Yet as thus construed, I have suggested, 
greatness of soul appears to come into conflict with these thinkers’ larger ethical schemes. This 
holds especially true of al-Ghazālī, whose considered stance on the ethics of esteem and self-
esteem would seem to drive a deep wedge between his outlook and the one embedded in 
ancient conceptions of the virtue and Aristotle’s more particularly. A reflexive appreciation of 
one’s greatness would seem to have no place within this outlook as conditioned by al-Ghazālī’s 
religious commitments. And although I have not commented on the aspect of the virtue that 
concerns the attitude to luck and the endurance of misfortune, it is at the very least clear that 
the abstraction of the reflexive aspect could hardly leave ancient approaches to this untouched, 
especially among the Stoics, given how deeply a reflexive stance of hauteur infused their 
approach. (Seneca: “I am too great, was born to too great a destiny to be my body’s slave.”) 
 This conclusion may now call to mind a broad point that has sometimes been made 
regarding Islamic culture and its relationship to some of the ethical concepts that shaped the 
progress of intellectual history in the Western context. At the end of his Theological Origins of 
Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie draws a contrast between the evolution of humanistic ideas 
in the Christian and the Islamic traditions. The emphasis within Islamic thought on the absolute 
difference between God and man at the expense of their ontological connection, and on divine 
omnipotence at the expense of human freedom, he writes, is what made Islam inhospitable to 
the kind of humanism that developed within the Christian tradition. He connects the latter 
development to the possibilities opened by the notion of divine incarnation, and more 
specifically to “the possibility for a form of humanism that grants quasi-divine status to human 
beings”—a notion manifest not only among humanists like Pico and Erasmus but also present in 
new guises among later philosophers such as Locke and indeed Kant, with his notion of human 
beings as ends in themselves. For orthodox Islam, by contrast, the notion of “the intrinsic value 
of the individual, as modernity has understood it since Petrarch, is…theologically problematic.” 
And it is, crucially, to al-Ghazālī that Gillespie appeals in crafting this comparison, taking his 
“devaluation of the individual” and “mystical focus on an omnipotent God” as a key factor that 
rendered mainstream Islam “unreceptive to the ideas that came to characterize modernity in 
the European world” (see Gillespie 2008, epilogue). 
 Like all interpretations that come in broad brushstrokes and bold print, this 
interpretation will make many readers uneasy. It notably leaves out, for example, the project of 
imitatio Dei that a plethora of Muslim thinkers, al-Ghazālī among them, made pivotal to their 
understanding of the best human life; and this of course was a project that focused attention on 
the continuities between man and God, though it also calibrated these against important 
discontinuities, as I briefly indicated above. Were we to focus on the ethics of self-worth—
intimately linked after all to larger views about human worth—and on al-Ghazālī’s stance on 
this topic, it would seem that the above discussion has served to lend support to Gillespie’s 
thesis. Yet even this conclusion, I would suggest, cannot be held down without locating it against 
a more inclusive appreciation of the conceptions of human worth and self-worth at work in 
Islamic ethical culture. My present paper has offered a first approach to these conceptions, by 
investigating an important “virtue of greatness” that I identified as the readiest heir of the 
ancient virtue of megalopsychia. Yet this, in fact, is not the only concept of greatness to be found 
within this ethical culture. There is a different concept that lived a far more vibrant life than the 
etiolated notion of greatness dutifully slotted into Miskawayh and al-Ghazālī’s taxonomies and 
ultimately  undigested by their ethical schemes. This was a concept which struck deeper roots 
  
reflecting the complex genealogies that entered into its formation and the multiple ethical 
discourses it inhabited, and in which the attitude to self-worth formed a significant element. I 
hope to devote a separate paper to its investigation.  
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